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1. Introduction 
1.1 Trust, the cornerstone of the economy 
The economic crisis of 2008 had a profound impact on society in the European Union (EU). Well 
known are reports of collapsed housing markets, defaults in the business sector, citizens with 
astronomic debts, and EU Member States facing shrinking production, GDPs and employment 
rates, along with excessive debt and deficit figures (Allen & Carletti, 2010; FCIC, 2011; Foster & 
Magdoff, 2009: 91-93). Irresponsible behavior of private financial institutions, fiscal laxity of 
Member States and EU authorities that lacked decision-making power turned out to be a lethal 
cocktail for European economies. As the crisis expanded, financial institutions, politicians, national 
governments and European institutions were held responsible by Europe’s inhabitants, whose trust 
in the economy and its participants had vanished (Boot, 2012: 110; Roth et al., 2013). A multitude 
of prominent scientists like Stiglitz, Swedberg, Tonkiss, Sapienza and Zingales point to the 
disappearance of confidence as the most problematic outcome of the crisis, because it had a 
substantial and structural influence on the markets involved. 
 Trust can be seen as an invisible stimulus for the effective functioning of the economy, as 
it is the prerequisite for any exchange, and works as a “generalised foundation (…) that underpins 
the wider socio-economic system” (Tonkiss, 2009: 196). Confidence creates the assumption among 
consumers that others will behave according to common norms of economic conduct and, as such, 
promotes economic efficiency, as it reduces the transaction costs involved in economic exchange 
(Fukuyama, 1995, in: Caldéron et al, 2001: 5). In absence of common understandings of trust one 
has to handle in a context where cheating, fraud and corruption cannot be ruled out and the risks 
and costs of exchanges are sizeable (Tonkiss, 2009: 197). 
 The significance of confidence for the economic system and its diverse markets has been 
embraced just recently by scholars in the field of economy. Beside some early careful attempts by 
Keynes, the concept of confidence was neglected by economists until not too long ago, as – in their 
eyes – it was not part of the limited set of rational factors that drove economic performance and 
behavior in standard economic theory (Swedberg, 2010a: 2). The ideas of classical economists 
were observed as mainstream, and they departed from a set of basic assumptions, in which there 
was no role for the concept of trust. Central in their economic analysis was the concept of an 
invisible hand that connected supply and demand to reach an optimal market outcome, based on 
the assumption of perfect rationality: actors in economic exchange possess full information about 
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an exchange, are capable of negotiating perfect contracts costlessly, and strive for optimal efficient 
deals. In such a context, transaction costs in an exchange – arising from uncertainty about the risk 
to be lifted – would be negligible, and the allocation of supply and demand of goods would be 
optimal, leading to efficiency (Baarsma et al., 2010; Bossone, 1999: 2-3; Leibenstein, 1966: 392; 
Lorenz, 1999: 301-302; Smelser & Swedberg, 2005: 3).  
Besides, classical economists argued that confidence was hardly measurable, and 
impossible to transform into an element useful in their models and formulas. Rather, they deemed 
trust an element that belonged to the field of psychology and sociology. Psychologists and 
sociologists indeed extensively assessed the role confidence played for individuals and in society, 
but these scholars did not pay attention to its impact in economics (Swedberg, 2010a: 2-3). 
However, over time the development of theories regarding assumptions of information, risk 
and uncertainty reshaped the tradition of economic analysis (Bossone, 1999: 2-3; Smelser & 
Swedberg, 2005: 3). With theories like Simon’s (1991) bounded rationality and coherent theories 
emphasizing the asymmetric distribution of information, the cost of information, and the relevance 
of risk and uncertainty (Bossone, 1999; Lippmann & McCall, 2001), the traditional perfect 
rationality perspective of costless and perfect information became obsolete, and the need for trust 
as a foundation for economic transactions in uncertain contexts was revealed. From the 1970s on, 
the rise of psychologic and sociologic influences in economy brought social phenomena like trust 
more at the center of the work of economic scholars. Building on the foundations of Keynes’ initial 
attempts, several prominent scholars – like Arrow, Fukuyama, Stiglitz, Swedberg, Sapienza and 
Zingales – started to focus their attention on trust in economic context. As a result, more research 
is executed to broaden the knowledge on trust, its causes and consequences, and how policymakers 
can establish it. Consecutive examinations of the relationship between trust and economic 
performance have confirmed the positive relationship between the two (Sapienza & Zingales, 2012; 
La Porta et al., 1997; Guiso et al., 2009; Caldéron et al., 2001). 
1.2 Trust in the financial sector 
One of the most vital elements of the economic system is the large group of institutions, like banks 
and credit rating agencies (CRAs) that provide financial services and products to firms and 
consumers. Their presence in the modern-day economy is indispensable, as a second-order 
economy that employs a crucial reallocative function, fosters growth and lowers transaction costs 
(Fleck & Von Lüde, 2015: 94; Tonkiss, 2009). Since the 1970s, financial institutions and their 
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services gained significance within society, and a shift from industrial to finance capitalism was 
observed by many scholars in the field of financialization. Their central argument is that finance 
has adopted a role beyond its traditional function as distributor of funds for the productive 
economy, towards an autonomous system that has changed the logics of the economic system and 
the working of democratic society (Swedberg, 2010b: 76; Van der Zwan, 2014: 99-100).  
Consequently, the financial sector has become increasingly vital for the functioning of the 
economy and society. In 2008, financial institutions were hit severely by a financial crisis, and 
given the significance of these firms for society the distress among citizens was sizeable 
(Swedberg, 2010b: 91). Beside financial problems caused by the economic downturn, financial 
institutions also faced reputational problems as they were held responsible for the eruption of the 
crisis by a large share of academics, political actors and the public. Several scholars emphasized 
that the “financial markets hinge on trust, and that trust has eroded” (Stiglitz, 2008; Tonkiss, 2009: 
196). Austrian scientists Knell and Stix (2009) found evidence that the financial crisis had led to a 
reduction in trust. In line with this reasoning, the European Investors’ Working Group (EIWG, 2010: 
2-3) stated in its report that it observed a diffused loss of confidence in the efficient functioning of 
the market, caused by the dis-functioning of the financial system. Predominantly, several malicious 
practices, like manipulation of interest rates, fraudulent traders, misconduct in the selling of 
mortgages, taxpayer bailouts of banks and large-scale tax evasion had a reinforcing effect on the 
bad image of the financial sector (Armstrong, 2012: 4; Roth, 2009: 203-208; Tonkiss, 2009: 196). 
Consequently, “banks, bankers and the whole industry are experiencing one of the worst crises of 
confidence ever” 1, due to their major role in the crisis that led up to the loss of public trust. 
Days after the Lehman Brothers’ default in September 2008 – which is observed as the 
starting point of the worldwide crisis – the Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve System (FED) 
argued that without intervention there probably was no economy on Monday (Swedberg, 2010b: 
71). The necessity of intervention in the financial sector was clear for policymakers in Europe as 
well, and policy measures were taken in the aftermath of the crisis. Chiefly, the intervention 
entailed a thorough revision of the regulatory framework present in the financial sector, which was 
completed with the establishment of the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) in 2011.  
                                                 
1 Lautenschläger, S. (2015), Reintegrating the banking sector into society: earning and re-establishing trust, Speech at the 
7th International Banking Conference ‘Tomorrow’s bank business model – How far are we from the new equilibrium’, Milan, 
September 28. 
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1.3 Research Question 
The increased attention of economic scholars for the concept of trust broadened our knowledge on 
the phenomenon. So far, research has indicated that trust is one of the most elementary pillars of 
any economic exchange, and it has a considerable impact on the functioning of markets. However, 
in a pre-crisis attempt to reform the EU framework of financial supervision – called the Lamfalussy 
process – policymakers were barely preoccupied with the importance of societal trust in financial 
institutions. Rather, they focused on designing a process of regulatory passage to answer effectively 
to the dynamic and globalizing financial markets and the coherent need for swift EU-wide 
regulation in the financial sector, which could increase competitiveness and efficiency. This system 
proved unfit to safeguard the stability of the financial markets in a time of crisis. 
This thesis examines to what extent policymakers in Europe did bear in mind the 
significance of trust in (the regulation of) economic markets during the subsequent process of 
revision of the regulatory framework after the crisis. To what degree were policymakers aware of 
the role of societal confidence in financial markets, and the causes and consequences of its presence 
and absence, in the run-up to the crisis? Based on what ideological foundation did policymakers 
make their decisions: traditional, neoclassical models of full information that ignore the concept of 
trust, or more modern, trust-centered theories build on assumptions of bounded rationality and 
limited information? Was the (re-)establishment of trust a key objective for policymakers in the 
policy process that resulted in the introduction of the ESFS? And how prominent is confidence 
anchored in the new regulatory framework? All in all, this thesis addresses these issues to provide 
a final answer to the following research question: 
To what extent did the intensified role of trust in modern economic theories shape the 
European regulatory policy response in the financial sector between 2008 and 2011? 
1.4 Methodology 
To assess whether, in the most recent reform effort, trust did receive the consideration of 
policymakers, it should deserve according to the significance it has been given by modern 
economists, this thesis make use of thorough examinations of primary sources of policymakers, 
expert groups, institutions and commissions involved in the process of policy revision after the 
crisis. The role of trust in the policy process is operationalized by the frequency and prominence 
with which the concept of trust in economic context is mentioned throughout official reports of the 
policy process. The prominence of confidence in a publication is assessed through the place and 
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importance it has in a text: is it mentioned briefly in one sentence of a text, or is it emphasized as 
the key reason or objective of the publication? In other words, the emphasis is not just on whether 
trust is mentioned, but rather on whether policymakers employ the phenomenon in their arguments 
in a similar method as modern economists, who argue that trust, uncertainty and incomplete 
information are vital and indispensable elements of present-day transactions in the financial sector. 
Likewise, reports are also examined on the degree to which they contain references to elements of 
traditional economic theories, such as a primary focus on efficiency, effectivity, competition and 
assumptions of full rationality and information. 
The policy process is split up in three separate parts in the analysis. First, the lead-in period 
of problem recognition and definition is assessed. Second, the process between problem 
recognition and the actual ratification of the policy outcome is analyzed. Finally, in the third part, 
the implemented legislative texts of the overarching ESFS and its subservient supervisory 
authorities are examined. All in all, this involves delving into the most important archival 
documentation and publications of relevant actors and stakeholders in the establishment process of 
the ESFS, to analyze to what extent policymakers acknowledge the importance of confidence in 
economic context, and give it a prominent role in the (process towards the) newly embedded 
regulation. The archival documentation consists of press releases, policy proposals, policy 
documents and legislative texts from the European Commission, the European Parliament and the 
European Council. Furthermore, reports from debates and conferences are analyzed, as well as 
contributions by expert groups, such as the De Larosière and Lamfalussy reports, Parliamentary 
Committees, external stakeholders and European institutions like the European Economic and 
Social Committee (EESC) and the European Central Bank (ECB). These primary sources are 
retrieved from EU databases, such as the EUR-Lex database and publications in web archives of 
European policymaking authorities, like the European Commission, the European Council and the 
European Parliament. 
As the crisis took place in 2008 and ESFS was established in 2011, only documents 
published within that period are analyzed. Overall, this research follows a qualitative, deductive 
structure, reasoning from general theoretical insights on the function and significance of trust and 
regulation in economic context, and applying these arguments to explain its presence in the policy 
process of a specific case – the financial sector – in a specific time period – from 2008 to 2011. 
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Actors involved in designing the new process are among others national financial supervisors, the 
Commission and some designated expert groups and commissions. 
1.5 Societal and scientific relevance 
Although scholars have collected much evidence claiming the significance of trust for the 
functioning of the economy and financial markets in recent years, research on the presence of the 
concept of confidence in the policy process and regulatory framework of the financial sector – a 
sector that hinges on trust (Stiglitz, 2008) – offers a valuable addition. Despite its claimed 
importance, the literature on trust in economic context, and especially in the financial sector, is still 
in its infancy, resulting in little knowledge on the phenomenon and its consequences (Swedberg, 
2010a: 2; Swedberg, 2010b: 72). At the same time, a multitude of scientific research investigated 
the role of financial institutions and provided articles that reported on the regulatory developments 
(a fairly limited selection of such articles used in this thesis contains for example works of: 
Benmelech & Dlugosz, 2010; Darcy, 2009; De Haan et al. 2014; De Haan et al., 2015; De Santis, 
2012; Fratianni & Marchionne, 2009; Hunt, 2009; Utzig, 2010; White, 2009 and White, 2010a). 
However, less analytical attention was paid to the degree to which creating and maintaining trust 
in the financial sector was warranted in the new regulatory framework. This thesis contributes to 
the filling of this knowledge gap. 
From a societal perspective, the relevance of this thesis stems from the devastating impact 
that the economic crisis of 2008 had on the society as a whole; the collapsing banks led to a ruined 
housing market, numerous defaults, decreasing GDPs and employment, and weakened purchasing 
power, investments and production (Allen & Carletti, 2010; FCIC, 2011; Foster & Magdoff, 2009: 
91-93). These consequences even had implications for the mental health of involved citizens 
(Karanikolos et al., 2013). But, foremost, with the gradual rise and enlargement of the crisis, trust 
in politics, government, institutions, and the financial sector vanished. Recent disruptive and 
unpredicted developments in political spheres – like the Brexit and Trump’s victory – show that 
conventional politicians and policymakers have lost their grip on the public, while populistic parties 
mushroom in all Western economies. Conventional policymakers were once highly trusted, but 
have lost their reliability in the eye of the public. To regain their position as entrusted entity, they 
need to comprehend the significance of public trust in society and its governing institutions.  
Restoring consumer confidence is emphasized to be one of the key elements to restore the 
economic system as a whole, because low trust has a negative impact on the stability of banks, the 
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level of investments and lending, resulting in a decrease in economic activity altogether (CSNB, 
2013: 14; Armstrong, 2012: 4-9: 4-5; Roth, 2009: 203-208; Tonkiss, 2009: 196). This contribution 
assesses whether policymakers were aware of this mechanism and implemented regulatory reforms 
that address the need for a more trust-centered perspective on markets and their regulation. So far 
the role confidence plays in financial systems did not attract much analytical attention from 
scholars, except from some behavioral economists, so additional analysis can offer increased 
insight on this phenomenon. Besides, the implemented framework and its coherent policy process 
can create a precedent for future cases of regulation of knowledge-intensive and dynamic markets, 
in which expert knowledge and innovation exceed knowledge of governments and outdate existing 
state regulation. An example of such a future case might be the currently booming market of 
fintech-firms (Trealeven, 2015). 
1.6 Chapter overview 
This thesis proceeds with a section in which the theoretical framework is introduced. The 
framework has a two-pronged structure, in which first trust, its various types and its function in 
and significance for the economy are explained, followed by a part on how regulation of a market 
can induce trust in a sector. Subsequently, the methodology and research methods used in this 
inquiry, are set out. After this section, the case is presented and analyzed. This part contains reports 
of a pre-crisis reform attempt, the role of the various financial institutions in the crisis and an 
overview of the problem identification, policy process and the regulatory framework of the ESFS. 
These elements of the process are examined to reveal the degree to which policymakers are 
preoccupied with the significance of the concept of trust in markets and their regulation. With the 
case analyzed, an answer to the research question can be formed in the conclusion. Besides, the 
conclusion also sheds light on possible recommendations, the limitations of the research and 
possibilities for further research. 
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2. Theory 
2.1 The concept of trust 
Primarily, confidence is of key importance, not just in a certain sector, but rather as a primary 
prerequisite in every inter- and transaction. Before explaining how trust facilitates economic 
transactions and how policymakers can apply regulation to increase trust, this section first 
elucidates the basic notion of the concept of trust. All in all, this piece will touch upon the 
significance of trust and confidence as an autonomous phenomenon, as well as in single 
transactions, the financial sector and the general economy. 
Trust and confidence are among the most analyzed subjects of psychologist, sociologists 
and modern economists, and numerous definitions of the concepts are published in scientific 
contributions. Many prominent scientists have debated (and are debating) on the optimal definition 
for trust. This thesis, however, does not have the objective or ambition to bring a revolutionary 
contribution to this conceptual debate. Rather, this research applies a broad definition of the 
concepts: confidence and trust can be seen as general predictions, expectations, stances or beliefs 
of a person or unit towards a given phenomenon. Furthermore, although some scientists distinguish 
between trust and confidence (see for example Tonkiss (2009) or Fleck & Von Lüde (2015)), this 
inquiry uses the two concepts interchangeably, as both confidence and trust can be observed as 
largely overlapping elements. Several other concepts, such as empathy, civility, respect, solidarity 
and toleration emerge from the overarching concept of confidence. Moreover, trust comes in 
multiple forms. For instance, it can be divided in personal, systemic and societal (Jones, 2002; 
Newton, 2001).  
 At the personal level, trust comes down to the expectation that a given person does what 
another one expects him or her to do. Both persons know that if the former person fails to do the 
expected, the latter person would have done better to act otherwise. At the same time, if the latter 
acts the way she does, she gives the former a selfish reason not to do the expected (Korczynski, 
2000: 4; Jones, 2002: 225). As such, personal trust is a highly psychologic phenomenon, which is 
relevant at the inter- and intrapersonal level. Societal trust, on the other hand, is a broad sociologic 
concept, built on Putnam’s idea of social capital as the main driver of confidence in society. Social 
capital “refers to features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1995: 67). Jones (2002: 225-
226) adds that in society, confidence can be seen as a complexity-reducing mechanism to cope with 
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one’s freedom. As such, it is a key element in social relationships, which bears implicit expectations 
for the future. Finally, trust in political and economic institutions is called systemic (or institutional) 
trust (Tonkiss, 2009). For political systems and institutions, systemic trust is based on a range of 
concepts like participation, citizenship, political interest and tolerance, concern with the public 
good, the ability to compromise and confidence in political institutions (Newton, 2001: 205).  
 In the consideration of various policy decisions, policymakers are mainly dealing with 
choices that influence trust at the latter two levels, societal and systemic trust. Both are the result 
of decisions and developments that exceed the inter- and intrapersonal sphere, and affect a 
community at the societal level. For this thesis, therefore, both societal and systemic trust are 
relevant. 
2.2 Trust in economic context 
The most basic notion of why any economy needs trust was brought forward by Simmel ([1907] 
1978: 178-179) more than a century ago: first, you yourself have to believe that a certain coin 
represents a certain amount value, and, second, you have to trust that others accept the coin at the 
value you attach to it (Swedberg, 2010: 15). In absence of such a common foundation of trust and 
confidence, one has to handle in a context where cheating, fraud and corruption are commonplace 
and the risks and costs of exchange are substantial (Tonkiss, 2009: 197). In this respect, Bossone 
(1999: 2-4) mentions the phenomenon of ‘incomplete trust’. Due to uncertainties, an actor has to 
be aware of the reasonable possibility that others may try to take inappropriate gains through either 
“deliberately reneging on obligations due on earlier commitments, or by hiding information 
relevant to transactions” (Bossone, 1999: 3).  
Contracts could represent a resolution in uncertain environments, as they provide a warrant 
that can be uphold in formal and legal settings. However, such a resort to laws and contracts is 
costly, while doing business on implicit arrangements build on common social norms minimizes 
the involved transaction costs (Tonkiss, 2009: 197). Furthermore, formal financial contracts are 
intrinsically incomplete, which implies that they cannot fully guarantee that the creditor will 
recover his funds (Caldéron et al., 2001: 7). Trust works, thus, as a mediator for the risk of socio-
economic interaction, promoting economic efficiency both at a macro- and microeconomic level. 
Or as Tonkiss (2009: 197) puts it more elegantly: “Trust leads a double life as both a social value 
and an economic resource; as such, it is a critical concept for linking social arrangements with 
economic outcomes.” According to EIWG (2010: 3), confidence in the financial sector is the main 
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driver in preserving efficient functioning markets and long-term economic prosperity, as trust 
boosts cross-border retail, institutional investment and integration. As a result, high trust societies 
produce more output than low trust societies. Overall, trust may be a crucial element for economic 
development and societies that are unable to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts 
are doomed to witness stagnation – see for example Third World societies (North, 1990: 54). 
These arguments all boil down to the argument Francis Fukuyama made in his renowned 
‘Trust’: economic prosperity is not so much a result of material characteristics like natural 
resources, highly educated staff, or the presence of good regulation and institutions. Neither is 
welfare the sole product of rational, self-interested entrepreneurs in the free market, as neoclassic 
economists suggest. Rather, economic prosperity requires (also) a culture of trust and a capacity 
for ‘spontaneous sociability’ (Fukuyama, 1995). In other words, the concept of trust does not solely 
refer to trust of investors or politicians, but rather to confidence from the broader, general public 
in the financial sector, and the economic system in general (Sapienza & Zingales, 2012: 130). Or 
as Swedberg (2010a: 3) sets out: “It is clear as well that the role of confidence is not limited (…) 
in the economy, to the area of finance.” The emphasis these writers put on trust, is in line with the 
trend nowadays for economic scholars to put trust and confidence at the center of their attention. 
All in all, systemic trust in economic and financial institutions and systems is widely 
embraced by economic scientists in recent years. But this trend is in sharp contrast with the 
perspective economists had on confidence and trust in economic context a few decades ago. 
Traditionally, the significant role of confidence, as “an important lubricant of a social system” 
(Arrow, 1974: 23, cited in: Swedberg (2010a: 13)) for the functioning of finance and the broader 
economy, was overlooked by traditional economists. Swedberg (2010a: 2-3) sums up three reasons 
for this blind spot of economists. First, they held a common conviction that confidence was an 
element of psychology and sociology, and not of economics. Besides, the intangible, versatile and 
psychologic nature of the concept of trust made it a hardly measurable phenomenon in the eyes of 
economists. That, in turn, made it difficult for traditional economists to transform the concept into 
a useful element for their formulas and models. As a result, mainstream economists largely ignored 
the instrument of trust (Keynes, 1936: 148-149; Walters, 1992: 423-425). Second, although 
psychologists and sociologists have indeed shown considerable interest in the phenomenon of 
confidence in respectively inter- and intrapersonal relations, and societal and organizational 
environments, extending their work field to economic or financial matters was never on their 
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agenda (Korczynski, 2000: 1-2; Swedberg, 2010a: 2-3).   
 Finally, the analyses of traditional economists were predominantly build on a limited set of 
rational factors that drove economic performance and behavior in traditional economic theory. 
Confidence was never part of the basic set of assumptions, underlying the rational factors that 
mainstream economists used (Swedberg, 2010a: 2). The traditional economic theory was centered 
around the classic theory of Adam Smith about the ‘invisible hand’, that matched supply and 
demand of products and services to realize an optimal market outcome. This theory started from 
the assumption of perfect rationality, which entails a number of theoretical prerequisites. For 
instance, all actors in an economic transaction possess complete and truthful information about the 
exchange. Moreover, no actor has to face costs to obtain the information relevant for the 
transaction. Also, all actors are expected to operate rationally in trade negotiations: in other words, 
they strive for the most efficient deal possible and are not satisfied with a less than perfect outcome 
(Baarsma et al., 2010; Bossone, 1999: 2-3; Leibenstein, 1966: 392; Lorenz, 1999: 301-302; 
Smelser & Swedberg, 2005: 3). Overall, such a context creates the possibility for perfect rational 
transactions, with an optimal and efficient allocation of supply and demand of goods. Due to perfect 
obtainable and complete information, the coherent transaction costs of searching for and 
negotiating on a good would be negligible, as would be the risk of cheating or fraud. Coase (1937: 
403-405) argues in his renowned ‘The Nature of the Firm’ that these marginal transaction costs 
enable consumers to close more efficient contracts. 
 However, since the 1970s, contributions of economists that were influenced by the field of 
psychology questioned the traditional economic theory and its assumption of perfect rationality 
and information. New theories emphasizing the assumptions of asymmetric information, bounded 
rationality and the existence of uncertainty and risk challenged the conventional method of 
economic analysis (Bossone, 1999: 2-3; Smelser & Swedberg, 2005: 3). Simon’s (1991) renowned 
theory of bounded rationality was one of the most important contributions. He argued that 
consumers were physically incapable of obtaining full information on a transaction, as information 
sources were close to inexhaustible for individuals and exceeded the limits of their human capacity. 
As a result, individuals sought for transactions that satisfied their needs, instead of seeking for an 
optimal transaction. This is called satisficing behavior and it undermines the assumption of perfect 
rational individuals in economic exchanges. An often used method for individuals to make 
satisficing decisions, is by relying on proxy signs. Proxy signs are simplifications of inexhaustible 
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information sources, provided by mediating firms, to give individuals an understandable reflection 
of a reality that is too comprehensive and complex for them to capture on their own. In many cases, 
therefore, one’s confidence is not based on some irretrievable information about the state of affairs 
in a specific sector, but rather on simplified signs broadly indicating the state of affairs (Swedberg, 
2010b: 74-75).  
Bossone (1999: 2) advocates “the need for a more radical departure from the neoclassical 
framework, and a much deeper study of the consequences of imperfections”. In this light, he 
challenges the assumption of perfect and costless information. He recognizes Simon’s argument of 
limited information, and claims that due to diversification and specialization in business, 
individuals have to rely on providers of services, who possess expert knowledge on a given subject. 
As a result, the providers have an informational advantage – an information asymmetry – over the 
individuals, for whom this disadvantage causes a lack of full trust (Bossone, 1999: 3). This 
‘incomplete trust’ creates uncertainty at the side of the individuals, as they are aware of the 
possibility that the provider of services may seek inappropriate gains, or hides information that is 
relevant for the transaction. Uncertainty and lack of information provide an incentive for 
individuals to search information or create formal contracts to lower the risk of the transaction 
(Bossone, 1999: 3). This, however, increases the costs of transactions, making them less efficient 
and perfect. 
Lippmann & McCall (2001: 7480-7485) share this thought and emphasize the time and 
costs accompanying the search. For individuals, it is difficult to estimate whether they have made 
use of the right information resources and whether they have collected optimal information. 
Consumers, therefore, either overspend on obtaining information, or they underspend and they risk 
becoming the victim of suppliers who abuse their information advantage. Williamson (1975) 
elaborates on this argument by introducing the ‘contractual man’, who possesses restricted 
knowledge and time due to uncertainty and complexity of products, and needs an erudite 
intermediary organization to reduce transaction costs and come to an optimal, rational choice. The 
search costs are called transaction costs, and combined with the theories mentioned above, they 
make the traditional theory of perfect rationality and perfect and costless information obsolete, as 
transactions inherently bear transaction costs. Furthermore, the rise of these theories underlined the 
need for trust as a foundation for economic transactions in uncertain contexts. 
13 
 
Bearing the new psychologic influences to traditional economic thinking in mind, 
sidetracks of mainstream economics gained momentum with the rise of modern economics. 
Economists opened up to innovative types of analysis, such as game theory, neuroeconomics and 
behavioral economics. (Neuro-)psychology – and with it the concept confidence – became far more 
influential in economic theories. In present days, economic scientists underwrite that trust and 
confidence are crucial in effective economic functioning, not only as a basis for exchanges between 
agents, but also as a “generalised foundation (…) that underpins the wider socio-economic system” 
(Tonkiss, 2009: 196). Put more technically: trust creates the assumption among consumers that 
others will behave according to common norms of economic conduct and, as such, promotes 
economic efficiency as it reduces the transaction costs involved in economic exchange (Fukuyama, 
1995, in: Caldéron et al., 2001: 5). Research shows that a decline in trust does affect economic 
decision making (Sapienza & Zingales, 2012: 125-127), and can have a paralyzing effect on both 
financing and investments (Guiso et al., 2009). In their research, La Porta et al. (1997) present 
proof for the influence of confidence on the economy, indicating that the amount of trusting people 
in a country has a significant correlation with aggregate economic statistics. Caldéron et al. (2001: 
7) also find evidence that the level of trust is a significant determinant of financial development. 
Tonkiss (2009: 196-198) accurately sets out what actually makes trust so important for 
society, the economy and, more specific, the financial sector. He cites a multitude of economists 
(among others: Beugelsdijk et al., 2004; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Whiteley, 2000; Zak & Knack, 
2001) who all come to the generally agreed outcome that trust and economic prosperity are 
positively correlated. People in wealthier economies tend to trust economic and political 
institutions more, while high levels of trust in these institutions boost the economy. In line with 
this, Delhey and Newton (2004: 16) conclude that “money matters for trust more than most things”. 
It is the development of economic and financial indicators that continuously seems to be an 
indicator of the height of systemic trust. This is further underlined by the European Social Survey 
(2016), in which successive waves of surveys show that respondents in wealthier economies report 
higher levels of systemic trust. Overall, confidence has a crucial role in the economic system, as 
the “spinal cord of economics” (Gurría, 2009). 
2.3 Financialization and trust in the financial system 
Simultaneously with the rise of psychologic influences in traditional economy, another crucial 
development in the landscape and thinking of economics took place in the 1970s. Scholars, 
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resembled in the field of financialization, observed a trend towards growing importance of the 
dynamic financial system and its key institutions, such as banks and CRAs, in the economy, as a 
result of internationalization (Swedberg, 2010b: 76). Financialization scholars see this as a shift 
from industrial to finance capitalism (Van der Zwan, 2014: 99-100). Traditionally, the financial 
system was a delicate system, highly reliant on trust (Keynes, 1930 in: Swedberg, 2010b: 102). It 
functioned as a second-order economy, facilitating the actual economy and employing a crucial 
reallocative function to foster growth and lower transaction costs (Fleck & Von Lüde, 2015: 94; 
Tonkiss, 2009). In recent decades, finance adopted a new role beyond its traditional function as 
provider of capital for the productive economy, towards an autonomous system that has changed 
the logics of the economic system and the functioning of democratic society (Van der Zwan, 2014: 
99-100). By now, the financial system was not only a part of the economy, but was one of its 
driving forces. One the one hand, this globalization of financial systems led to increased credit 
possibilities throughout financial markets worldwide (Swedberg, 2010b: 76). On the other hand, 
economies and societies became dependent on financial institutions to such a great extent, that the 
institutions’ performance directly influenced the economy. 
The fact that the reach and impact of (trust in) the financial sector exceed the financial 
markets might not come as a surprise. Not only financial markets’ complexity has increased, 
elements of financial markets have also shown an evolution in becoming increasingly and 
significantly interwoven with each other, and also with (the financial state of) big corporations, 
states and investors, known as the financial trilemma (Mayer, 2008: 617; Tonkiss, 2009: 201). 
Besides, due to the allocative function of financial institutions, money lending and seeking firms 
from various sectors and countries are not only related to the financial organization they interact 
with, but they form an interrelated and wide-reaching network of organizations and markets active 
in and dependent on capital from the financial sector (Mayer, 2008: 618). The degree to which the 
market has become interwoven with surrounding markets has increased the systemic risk that 
failure of one of the big players in the financial sector has on the economy as a whole. This trend 
towards more systemic risk implies a rise of the importance of systemic trust in the financial 
system, as trust is one of the pillars of a well-functioning financial system. 
What is more, Swedberg (2010b: 73) cites Bagehot who claims that systems of financial 
institutions demand an exceptionally high level of trust, due to two reasons. First, deposits have a 
short-term nature, and they will withdraw their funds from the bank if they do not trust them. But 
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as loans have a long-term nature, banks will not be able to give back depositors all their money, as 
their money is on loan to others. Second, if loaners of money turn out to be insolvent, the bank 
incurs losses, which must be offset against the capital of the bank. Related to this risk is moral 
hazard; once an actor is insured against a risk, he will behave less responsible, for the consequences 
of the risk are not borne solely by the actor (Akerlof (1970: 493). Banks, thus, also have to trust 
consumers. Overall, banks and their clients make up a trust-intensive industry (Swedberg, 2010b: 
73). Due to this trust-intensive nature and their interrelatedness, banks are extremely vulnerable for 
situations with ‘hidden losses’. If one bank gets in financial trouble, and turns out to have secret 
losses or an unknown weak financial position, this can set off a public panic that echoes through to 
all financial institutions and diminishes confidence in the whole system (Swedberg, 2010b: 73). 
Such a diminution of confidence can then lead to hesitating firms, consumers and 
governments, and eventually economic downturn. In this respect, Swedberg also cites Merton’s 
famous ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’: the rumor of wrongdoings in the financial sector, non-complying 
states and approaching economic distress – whether valid or not – leads to hesitation in society, 
which makes the consequences of an unreal speculation sufficiently real to become reality (Merton, 
1968: 476). Akerlof and Shiller (2009: 16) call this impact of confidence on economy the 
confidence multiplier. 
Building on the findings of financialization theories, scholars dove into the role of systemic 
trust in financial institutions operating in wider economic systems. According to Tonkiss (2009: 
197) for instance, institutional trust in financial markets and institutions give an exceptionally good 
indication of the relationship between financial exchange and larger economic systems and 
sentiments. He highlights the undeniable significance of financial markets on trust in the economy 
and society: “Financial markets capture the relationship between particular exchanges and a larger 
economic system very well. Indeed the financial crisis could be a perfect illustration of the trust 
thesis, as specific exchanges (lending or investment) are paralysed as part of a larger trust crisis”.  
Systemic trust in the financial sector and its institutions, thus, can be seen as an excellent 
parameter for the broader economic sentiment in a country. Numerous researches have confirmed 
this relationship. For instance, Hudson (2006) finds that systemic trust is statistically related to 
general levels of trust. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2005: 2557) contribute empirical evidence 
from the Netherlands and Italy to this argument, showing that investment in products of financial 
institutions is based on fundamental trust in the overall system: “The decision to invest in stocks 
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requires (…) an act of faith (trust) that the data in our possession are reliable and that the overall 
system is fair.” Due to the increased complexity and distance of financial markets for average 
citizens, the trust problem has become even more present in this sector (Tonkiss, 2009: 198). 
Overall, trust in financial institutions cannot solely be seen as an autonomous phenomenon. 
Rather, it might be considered in a larger web of trust in the financial markets, national economies 
and the European economy – to quote Stiglitz (2008) in this respect: “the crisis in trust extends 
beyond banks” and Tonkiss (2009: 201): “the crisis of public trust extends beyond financial 
markets and market actors to policymakers themselves”. Gurría (2009) supplements that the crisis 
in financial markets may have impacted on individuals’ confidence in wider economic and political 
spheres, affecting governments, regulations, banks, corporations and even open markets and 
globalization as a whole. The existence of a foundational sense of trust is the pre-condition for an 
economic system, as well as for any economic exchange within that system (Tonkiss, 2009: 201). 
Amplifying this reasoning is Mayer’s (2008: 617) finding that the financial sector is of 
significant influence on the entire economy and its growth. Scientific research elucidates on the 
one side the significant role the financial sector has as part of the economy as a whole, while at the 
same time it shows that the financial sector is one of the key indicators of the level of trust, not just 
in terms of trust in financial institutions, or the financial sector, but even broader, to the level of 
confidence in the social, political and economic system and foundations of a country (Roth, 2009: 
203). The fact that financial institutions have a distinct role in today’s economy follows evidently 
from this section, and is agreed upon by a multitude of scholars over the years (DNB, 2011: 6; 
Demirgüc-Kunt & Levine, 2008: 59-61; Epstein, 2005: 3-5; King & Levine, 1993: 717-718; 
Schumpeter, [1911] (2004)). Fleck & Von Lüde (2015: 94) even classify the financial sector as a 
“second order economy” that settles the crucial financial needs within variable time frames and 
places in the worldwide economy. As such, the impact of the crisis on the level of trust in financial 
institutions is in reality a parameter of the significance and level of impact that the crisis had on 
society as a whole (Tonkiss, 2009: 196-198, 201). 
The importance of trust and confidence for the functioning of economic and financial 
systems is set out in this section so far. However, it is necessary to mention a serious caveat to the 
element of confidence and trust in economic systems, because blind trust in authoritative parties, 
like large financial corporations or states, neither is desirable. Keynes (1936, cited in: Swedberg, 
2010a: 10-11) sets out why boundless confidence is undesirable. Consumers make decisions in 
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uncertain markets, like the one for financial products, based on conventions – like proxy signs – 
about reality. Conventions are made because consumers lack the knowledge and capacity to obtain 
essential information and, therefore, “rely on some kind of substitute, in which we place our 
confidence” (Swedberg, 2010a: 20). Proxy signs give consumers the confidence to make decisions, 
but these conventions are no more than oversimplifications of reality, built on the opinions of 
professional investors, superficial knowledge and averages of a diverse group of data. As 
professional investors are opportune and aimed at short term profit, while opinions based on 
superficial knowledge have the tendency to fluctuate based on public opinion, the overall sentiment 
of consumers can be vastly volatile, which causes confidence in financial institutions to be instable. 
Moreover, the instable nature of trust in the financial market causes the activities on the stock 
market – ‘speculation’ – to have more impact on the economy than the actual production – 
‘enterprise’. Psychological factors that affect trust, like reputation and image, thus have a more 
influential role in economics than actual business performance.  
Akerlof and Shiller (2009: 12) build upon Keynes’ theory. They call confidence the most 
crucial ‘animal spirit’ in economic life and relations. Animal spirits are the non-rational drivers of 
economic behavior, the ‘noneconomic motivations’. As opposed to economists’ view that trust is 
undoubtedly based on rational information, they argue that trust goes beyond the rational and that 
trusting consumers often discard certain information. Even if crucial information is processed by 
consumers, they may still not act on it rationally, because they act according to what or who they 
trust to be true. In other words, Akerlof and Shiller further question the rationality assumption, 
arguing that how one acts in certain (economic) exchanges is not solely captured by his or her 
calculative, cognitive capacity. Rather, economists have to bear in mind that, beside a cognitive 
capacity, a person also has an emotional and more holistic dimension (Swedberg, 2010: 20). 
Especially in markets ‘for speculative securities, whose yield is most uncertain’, confidence and 
hope tend to distort our rational judgment and transform it into unduly high optimism, while 
apprehension converts our judgment in unduly low pessimism (Lavington, 1922: 32). Swedberg 
(2010a: 11) also mentions Griffin and Tversky (1992: 411) in this respect, who argue that “people 
are more confident in their judgments than is warranted by the facts”. 
This section has set out the key importance of trust in both the economy and the financial 
system. Although, recently scholars in the field of economics have put more emphasis on trust, 
these contributions still, mainly, come from specialized behavioral economists. All in all, the 
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phenomenon is not yet understood well enough by mainstream economists, and has not yet 
attracted sufficient attention in their analyses (Swedberg, 2010b: 104). Furthermore, Swedberg 
(2010b: 103) argues that confidence in the financial sector should not only receive more attention 
as an element of economic analysis. Rather, he encourages policymakers and politicians to 
comprehend the significance of the element of trust for the functioning of the financial system. 
Confidence in general, and particularly in the financial system, is in nature political, and could be 
used by policymakers as a political tool (Swedberg, 2010b: 103). Given the financial system’s key 
importance for the economy and society as a whole, the amplification of its functioning through 
(re-)establishing trust in the sector should be one of their key policy objectives. As Korczynski 
(2000: 2) wrote strikingly: “Just because trust may have beneficial functions for advanced 
economies does not mean that trust will necessarily arise to fulfil these functions”. The next section, 
therefore, discusses the intervention instruments policymakers have, to induce trust in a market. 
2.4 Regulation as an instrument to establish trust 
As the previous paragraph learned that modern economic scholars emphasize trust to be a central 
element in the financial and economic system, it is obvious that the concept should be considered 
seriously in the regulation of these systems. This section clarifies the possibilities for policymakers 
to enshrine trust through regulation. Following the foundations of theories of institutional economy 
and economic organization, regulation of markets is traditionally based on minimalizing 
transaction costs, either through markets or through hierarchy (Hazeu, 2007: 11-18). Regulation is 
conceptualized as “the sustained and focused attempt to alter behavior of others according to 
defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or 
outcomes” (Black, 2002: 25). The concept of regulation consists of standard-setting, monitoring 
compliance and enforcement. These tasks are nowadays executed not only by public institutions, 
but by private and non-governmental organizations as well (Havinga, 2006: 516). Morgan and 
Campbell (2011: 19-27) mention several ways in which non-public regulation could be established 
in a market. For instance, as happened in the case of financialization, a task provided by private 
organizations grows in significance and becomes a function with public value, or a task is gradually 
privatized under pressure of an increasingly efficiency-minded society. 
  Efficiency – acting rational in contexts of relative scarcity – is the central element in 
achieving cost minimization. A trade between two parties entails a two-way transfer of property 
rights, stipulated in formal contracts. Creating such a contract is accompanied by costs and if these 
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transaction costs are too high for a given product, people waive the product. Therefore, mitigating 
transaction costs optimizes the allocation of supply and demand of products or services, leading to 
efficiency (Leibenstein, 1966: 392). Transaction costs problems can be solved predominantly in 
two ways. If supply meets demand for a given product without governmental intervention, and 
consumers and producers are not faced with high costs in trading, and consequently there is no 
problem of ‘incomplete trust’, then markets and price mechanisms are the leading coordination 
mechanisms in providing a market equilibrium. At the same time, markets in which other interests 
influence the market outcome, or in which trust between negotiating counterparts is not establish 
automatically, a different coordination mechanisms might be required (like government regulation) 
to offer an adjusted market environment with more hierarchy, which provides more efficiency or a 
more desirable distribution of welfare (Hazeu, 2007: 11-18). 
 In other words, markets frequently offer information to consumers in an efficient manner, 
and thereby, create efficient outcomes. However, in some markets – especially in which great 
information asymmetries exist between provider and customer – welfare gains might be reached 
through (government or corporate) interference to breach barriers that hinder efficient allocation 
of information and transactions. As such, two types of market coordination are distinguished: first, 
private horizontal market forces, build on the perspective of traditional classic economists, who 
focus on the dogma of optimal efficiency through a sense of freedom and the absence of state-
induced legislation. Second, public or corporate, vertical and hierarchical regulations, indicating 
either private or public possession over a given product or resource (Curtin & Senden, 2011: 168; 
Hardin, 1968, Hazeu, 2007: 11-18). The key question for each unregulated economy, then, 
becomes whether – left to itself to function – it can create enough trust in the market to function 
well. If the answer to that question is negative, public intervention aimed at establishing a 
foundation of trust has to be considered (Korczynski, 2000: 12). 
An observation that follows from the previous paragraph is that establishing confidence in 
the economy and financial systems is important, but that this confidence should not evolve to 
overconfidence in possibly opportunistic institutions. Following this reasoning, “trust always 
entails a risk” (Simmel, 1907, cited in: Swedberg, 2010a: 16). Balancing societal confidence 
between under- and overconfidence in authoritative actors and the actual state of the financial and 
economic system is a key public task for state institutions in society. According to Roth (2009), a 
loss of citizen’s confidence in a market-based economy goes hand in hand with the desire for more 
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state intervention in the system (2009: 203-204). Keynes (1936, cited in: Swedberg, 2010a: 10-11) 
also emphasized that states have to intervene to guarantee responsible investment. Tonkiss (2009: 
201) shared this belief and urged governments to take an interventionist role in a crisis situation: 
“There is a central regulatory role to be played in restoring public confidence in the integrity and 
efficiency of institutions whose purpose, after all, is (…) to allocate investment across the 
economy.” Although he admitted there is no irrefutable argument to grant government actors this 
allocative role instead of market actors, the former “do have an important part to play in ensuring 
the financial sector performs its economic function effectively, and in promoting wider confidence 
in the system.” Introducing more formal means of securing confidence can provide reliable 
conditions for economic behavior (Tonkiss, 2009: 202). Ideally, trust could in that case be rebuild 
“through regulations that require financial players to stand behind their promises and tell the truth, 
together with strict oversight to make sure they do” (Reich, 2008). 
 Multiple scholars endorse the idea that state regulation is necessary to let financial 
institutions act in accordance with codes of conduct, as this could enhance trust and decrease the 
market power of firms (Armstrong, 2012: 4-9; Hellmann et al., 2000, Hill, 2004; Utzig, 2010). As 
Majone (1997: 141) argued, regulation might ensure market efficiency and the viability of markets 
in systems where trust and transparency are of key importance. However, this only applies if 
regulation is able to remove market failures at reasonable (transaction) cost. 
 Furthermore, a general stimulator of societal confidence in regulatory interventions stems 
from good governmental performance. Reassessment of existing policy frameworks to tackle 
possible market failures is a first, necessary step towards solving social and economic problems, 
but whether this intervention is also sufficient to reach the goal of enhancing confidence is, above 
all, dependent on how much trust citizens have in the institutions that implement and execute the 
regulatory change. The central question, therefore, is whether consumers have the faith that 
policymakers can reach the objective they have set out. If citizens do not have that trust, the 
introduction of the policies will presumably not lead to the desired outcome of more citizen trust. 
Elaborating on this, Miller (1974) states that trust in governmental and political organizations is 
based on their performance: the cumulative outcome of transactions between rulemaking 
authorities and consumers determines, as a sort of ‘corporation balance-sheet’, the level of public 
trust in government. Thus, the creating and implementing of policies gives authorities trust from 
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satisfied consumers, while it reaps cynicism from disappointed consumers (Citrin, 1974: 973; 
Keele, 2007: 241). 
 Bossone (1999: 17-24) sums up various possibilities for the public sector to enhance trust 
in the financial sector. More than in other markets, transactions in the field of finance require trust 
(Swedberg, 2010b: 73). Individuals have less knowledge than specialized financial firms and make 
transactions based on promises of future returns (Bossone, 1999: 17). First, policymakers might 
establish trust in the financial sector by improving the enforcement technologies of the financial 
infrastructure. This infrastructure entails the legal system, financial regulation and the security of 
the payment systems (Bossone, 1999: 17).  
However, solely focusing on the enforcement instruments is insufficient and costly. 
Bossone, therefore, emphasizes the need to incentivize financial institutions to conduct properly 
through market forces, as for financial intermediaries reputational capital – how their past 
performance and proper conduct is linked to their future profits – is of key significance, 
Consequently, policymakers should create incentives to induce trustworthy behavior of financial 
institutions through aligning the firm’s reputational capital with managers’ self-interest (Bossone, 
1999: 17-19). ‘Mild regulatory restraints on market competition’ by policymaking institutions 
might incentivize financial firms to focus more on enhancing their reputational capital to 
outcompete rival firms, rather than competing purely on price (Bossone, 1999: 19). In a sector 
where competition on prices is fierce and price levels barely differ, the margins for its participants 
are marginal. Financial institutions, therefore, have to take considerable financial risk to secure 
deals with a limited profit margin. As a result, Bossone argues that policymakers should encourage 
financial institutions to focus competition on other aspects of their services. For instance, regulators 
could encourage financial institutions to improve their reputational capital, by providing licenses 
to firms that put much effort in enhancing their reputation, or they could advise firms to diversify 
their financial portfolio, as a way to spread risk and, consequently, lower the societal risk in case 
of their failure (Bossone, 1999: 20-21).  
 Self-regulation is another supervisory option mentioned by Bossone (1999: 21-22). As 
financial institutions are sensitive to each other’s behavior, monitoring one another on good 
conduct and sanctioning each other for malpractices can be effective as well. Self-regulatory 
organizations can be established by market participants within financial communities, for instance 
to introduce a level-playing field through internal statutory rules and codes of conduct (Bossone, 
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1999: 21). Besides, self-regulation can also be introduced to satisfy the public as it invokes public 
trust. As such, preserving an authoritative position for private institutions could enhance societal 
confidence (Havinga, 2006: 519). Still, governments have a key role to play in self-regulatory 
systems in financial communities. Policymakers have to be involved in the self-regulatory 
principles set out by the community. Furthermore, they should monitor the operations and overall 
functioning of the self-regulatory system and intervene if the principles and policies of the self-
regulatory system pursue improper objectives or if the principles and policies are in conflict with 
general rules of fair market competition (Bossone, 1999: 22).  
  Some scholars in the field of public policy claim that market regulation executed by private 
elements should be completely cleared from political accountability, because it could negatively 
influence the market’s reliability, flexibility and efficiency (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012: 105-107; 
Lytton, 2014: 571). However, in line with Bossone’s argumentation, Van Waarden (2008: 94) 
advocates that some form of supervision and regulation on the private expertise is needed to provide 
citizens with the credibility that new market failures are prevented. Public trust in self-regulated 
private institutions wanes in absence of such checks and balances. Also, public institutions solve 
the lack of accountability and decision-making that private organizations struggle with (Levi-Faur, 
2005: 19, 21). Policymakers can provide a foundation of trust through regulation and monitoring. 
Moreover, regulation helps legitimizing markets and facilitating the functioning of the market, 
while it offers politicians the ability to control the economy at the same time (Levi-Faur, 2005: 19, 
21). Overall, the participation of public institutions that enjoy popular trust conveys a sense of 
trustworthiness, transparency and responsibility, as well as a feeling of control over the exercise of 
public functions, to citizens (Curtin & Senden, 2011: 167-168).  
 Finally, Bossone (1999: 22-24) highlights the importance of transparency of financial 
institutions for trust in their functioning. With limited variation in price, consumers focus their 
decision for a financial institutions on alternative elements. Firms that prove to be candid and 
transparent about their performance and services are in that case favored by consumers. 
Policymakers can play a role in the distribution of information about financial institutions, for 
instance by facilitating private parties to take on the role of provider of market information 
(Bossone, 1999: 23-24). Institutions with solid financial positions will in this case be willing to 
provide information on their position, while institutions with weaker positions are incentivized to 
amplify their position.  
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Case selection 
This thesis contributes to the knowledge that exists so far on the phenomenon of trust in economic 
context. Although trust has received more attention in recent years by several side-tracks of 
mainstream economics, knowledge on its roots, causes and effects is still in its infancy. As set out 
above, the functioning of the economy and its markets is highly dependent on the degree of trust 
between suppliers and consumers of a good. If trust does not appear in a market by itself, the 
market’s functioning will be hampered. States, then, have to consider public intervention to 
establish confidence and guarantee the market functions well, as just because trust is important for 
economies to function, it will not automatically arise to fulfill its task. Policymakers thus have to 
be aware of the significance of trust in present-day complex and impersonal transactions. This 
inquiry analyzes whether policymakers indeed bear in mind the concept of confidence in economic 
context and let the concept play a leading role during the policy process. The analysis does so by 
examining a sector for which the presence of confidence is particularly important, the financial 
sector. Swedberg (2010b: 73) notes that the system of financial institutions “demands an extra high 
level of trust, much higher than elsewhere in the economy”. Arguments from the field of 
financialization already provided that the financial sector and its institutions represent an 
exceptionally accurate reflection of the overall economy, and as such offer a valid unit of 
observation. 
 More specific, the awareness of policymakers of the concept of trust in financial sector 
regulation is analyzed in the aftermath of the crisis. Scholars like Tonkiss (2009: 197) and 
Swedberg (2010b: 72) agree that this financial crisis cannot be understood without taking the role 
of confidence into account. The paralyzed market for financial exchanges gives a perfect 
illustration of this argument. After the outbreak of the crisis, EU policymakers worked on a 
reorganization of financial sector supervision in Europe. This policy process was finalized in 2011 
with the introduction of the new European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS). 
3.2 Operationalization and Research Methods 
The analysis, therefore, focuses on revealing the degree to which the concept of confidence in 
contemporary economic theories had a central role in EU policymakers’ policy process and the 
outcome of a ESFS. This analysis is executed in a specific qualitative approach, based on several 
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methodological choices. First, it is important to specify the definition of the key variable, by 
elaborating on what is meant by the concept of confidence. Although some scientists distinguish 
between trust and confidence, the two are used interchangeably in this inquiry, as both confidence 
and trust can be observed as largely overlapping elements that measure the general attitude of a 
person or unit towards a given phenomenon. Concepts related to trust, like empathy, civility, 
transparency, respect, public interest, consumer well-being and solidarity – that either arise as a 
result of confidence or are synonyms for it – are examined as well in consecutive official reports 
of the policy process. Predominantly, this inquiry focuses on what role EU policymakers see for 
confidence and its coherent concepts in economic contexts with regard to the regulation of the 
financial sector, and whether their perspective resembles the role that modern economists attribute 
to the concept of trust in economic transactions. 
 Second, an observable and measurable definition has to be created for the key concept. This 
process of operationalization, thus, entails a method to visualize the extent to which trust and 
coherent concepts are central in the policy process. Predominantly, the frequency and prominence 
with which the concept of trust in economic context is mentioned throughout official reports of the 
policy process and in legislative texts is the main indicator of the presence of arguments of modern 
economic principles. The prominence of confidence in economic context in a publication is 
assessed through the place and importance it has in a text: is it mentioned briefly in one sentence 
of a text, or is it emphasized as the key reason or objective of the publication? 
In other words, in analyzing the publications the focus lies not just on whether or not trust 
is mentioned, but rather on whether policymakers employ the phenomenon in their arguments in a 
similar line of reasoning as modern economists, who argue that trust, uncertainty and incomplete 
information are essential and indispensable elements of every economic transaction, especially in 
the field of financial products. Likewise, reports are also examined on the degree to which they 
contain references to elements of traditional economic theories, such as a singular focus on 
efficiency, effectivity, free markets, competition and optimal allocation in the problem definition 
and in proposed solutions. Overall, the analysis of all published contributions gives insight in 
whether EU policymakers explicitly shared the perspective of contemporary economists on 
confidence in their understanding of and solution to the crisis, or whether the policymakers did not 
(or only briefly and symbolically) mention the loss of trust in their comprehension of the problem 
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and used different arguments, for instance building on traditional economic concepts, to propose 
policies to tackle the unrest in the financial sector. 
Third, the reports used in the analysis provide a chronological overview of consecutive 
events and publications in the policy process of the revision of financial sector regulation in the 
EU. Among the official reports examined in the analysis are press releases, policy proposals, policy 
documents and legislative texts from the European Commission, the European Parliament and the 
European Council. Furthermore, reports from debates and conferences are analyzed, as well as 
contributions by expert groups, such as the De Larosière and Lamfalussy reports, Parliamentary 
Committees, external stakeholders and European institutions like the EESC and the ECB after the 
crisis.2 These primary sources are retrieved from EU databases, such as the EUR-Lex database and 
publications in web archives of European policymaking authorities, like the European 
Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament. 
Fourth, the case has to be demarcated with regard to the time period and geographic range 
used, to keep the scope of the study within realistic and workable limits. The ESFS was designed 
in the aftermath of the crisis and came into force on 1 January 2011. It is seen as one of the most 
elaborate transnational reforms in the EU. The research, therefore, covers the period from the first 
post-crisis, public recognition of EU policymakers of the necessity to reform financial sector 
supervision in 2008, until the moment that the ESFS officially entered into force in 2011. Overall, 
the research entails a case study to test the argument of a growing importance of trust in the context 
of economic regulation, with the policy process of the establishment of the ESFS between 2008 
and 2011 as the case, and trust as the key variable, which is made measurable through looking into 
the most important archival documentation and publications of relevant actors in that time period. 
All in all, the analysis examines to what extent policymakers comprehend the importance of 
confidence, and give it a prominent role in the (process towards the) newly embedded supervisory 
framework in the financial sector.  
Finally, the policy process is split up in three separate parts in the analysis. First, the lead-
in period towards the policy process is assessed. Was the development of societal trust at the center 
of policymaker’s comprehension of the causes and outcomes of the crisis? In other words, to what 
degree was the disappearance of trust part of EU policymakers’ problem definition at the start of 
the crisis? Second, the policy process between the recognition of the necessity to reform the 
                                                 
2 See Appendix I for an overview of all documents examined in the analysis. 
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existing supervision of the financial system, and the actual ratification of the policy process’ 
outcome is analyzed. This part will shed light on how preoccupied policymakers were with the 
purpose of repairing the loss of confidence in the financial sector throughout their meetings and in 
their publications. Finally, in the third part, the implemented legislative framework of the ESFS 
and its subservient supervisory authorities are examined. Have policymakers enacted the objective 
of re-establishing trust concretely in the legislative texts to force executers and supervisors of the 
framework to actively stimulate and pursue societal confidence in financial institutions and the 
overarching financial system? 
 Overall, this research follows a qualitative, deductive structure, reasoning from general 
theoretical insights on the function and significance of trust and regulation in economic context, 
and applying these arguments to explain the policy process in a specific case – the financial sector 
– and time period – between 2008 and 2011. Actors involved in designing the new process are 
among others national financial supervisors, the EU policymaking institutions and designated 
expert groups and commissions. 
3.3 Validity, generalization and threats to inference 
The external validity of this research stems from the assumption that an emphasis on trust in the 
reform of financial supervision in the EU would indicate that European policymakers have a 
specific focus on trust in other areas of economic policy as well. Although each type of economic 
policy in the EU has its distinct origin and characteristics, they are dealt with predominantly by a 
restricted group of EU policymakers in the Council, in a specific Directorate-General of the 
Commission, and in the Parliament and its specialized Parliamentary Committees. If the analysis 
proves that EU policymakers were preoccupied with the concept of trust in the ESFS’ policy 
process, it can at least be argued that the policymakers comprehend and agree with the new 
understanding of modern economists of the role of trust in economic context, and take these 
theories into account in future reform processes in the field of economic policy. 
 Furthermore, the level of attention EU policymaking institutions pay to the concept of trust 
affects the degree to which it is present in regulatory policies of the individual member states. 
Member States and EFTA states are highly integrated in their fiscal, social and economic policy, 
and their common objectives and agreements seem to stimulate further convergence (Caminada et 
al., 2008: 1; Sedelmeier, 2015: 413-415). Policies that are decided upon at the European level have 
to be integrated in national legislation to enable their smooth functioning. As a result, objectives 
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of trust incorporated in European legislation have to be dealt with at the national level as well. 
Also, EU policymaking institutions predominantly consist of European policymakers, that are 
chosen or elected in their national member state. It is reasonable that these EU policymakers make 
similar considerations in policymaking processes as their national counterparts. 
Generalization beyond European countries is less obvious. Although all EU Member States 
are developing and democratic countries by U.N. standards, they are incommensurable with other 
industrialized countries, such as Japan and the U.S., because these countries are not bound to 
collective EU policymaking (Campbell et al., 2014).3 Therefore, generalization of the research 
outcomes to countries outside of the EU is not justifiable. In other words, if EU policymakers are 
indeed bearing in mind the importance of trust in their regulatory considerations, that does not 
provide any proof for a claim that policymakers in other continents do so as well. Still, it could be 
argued that the outcome is generalizable to national Member States and to other EU economic 
policy processes and outcomes that took place since the crisis, as the same institutions – EU 
policymaking institutions and national authorities – are involved in much of the European 
economic policymaking.  
The trustworthiness of the report of the policy process is determined by its accuracy and 
wholeness. The use of official publications and reports of meetings by reputable and mature EU 
databases and archives from the EUR-Lex, the Commission and the Parliament, guarantees that the 
documents used are reliable. The decisive EU policymaking institutions made clear statements 
about their opinions in official publications and in reports of their debates. However, meetings in 
the informal sphere between policymakers, stakeholders and lobbyists are less well reported in 
public archives. The analysis does, nonetheless, entail opinion statements of several key non-
policymaking stakeholders. The combination of all these expressions give a trustworthy report of 
the various positions of the involved stakeholders in the debate on the reform, and how they 
attempted to alter the policy outcomes in informal settings.  
                                                 
3 Twenty five of the twenty seven countries are in the top 50 of the Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy 2014’ 
(Campbell et al., 2014). The remaining two countries – Malta and Luxembourg – were not on the ranking, but given the fact 
that their Democracy scores were well above the Europe and Central-Asia average, these countries can be characterized as 
democratic countries as well (See The Worldwide Governance Indicators, on: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports). 
The World Bank (2016), ‘Least developed countries: UN classification’, on: http://data.worldbank.org/region/LDC (visited 
on 7-4-2016). 
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4. Analysis 
The previous sections discussed the theoretical implications of trust for economic interaction, the 
methods for policymakers to induce societal trust in the financial sector through regulation, and the 
research methods used to assess whether policymakers indeed put trust at the core of their 
consideration in economic policy. Against this background, this chapter presents the actual case 
study. Starting with the role of prominent financial institutions – banks and CRAs – in the financial 
system and in particular in the crisis, and concluded with an account of the degree to which 
policymakers mentioned the indispensability of trust in the financial sector in their problem 
definition at the start of the crisis. Then, the policy process of revision of the regulation and the 
establishment of the ESFS is reported, along with a careful investigation of their most prominent 
publications and documents. Finally, the realized framework and the legislative documents 
underlying them are examined in the last section. 
4.1 The role of financial institutions in the crisis 
Banks 
Banks represent the most well-known part of the financial sector. Banks function as financial 
intermediaries, that resolve two problems. First, financial institutions can diminish the difficulty 
and corresponding costs of matching the complex demand of money seekers and providers, and 
second, they solve the incompatibility of the unique monetary wishes of credit seeking and 
providing parties (Casu & Girardone, 2006: 3-5). Because of the economies of scale originating 
from the sizeable financial assets of banks, they can also reduce risks by pooling the risks of 
insolvent individuals (Casu & Girardone, 2006: 4-10). Overall, banks smoothen economy through 
the reduction of transaction costs. Dutch authorities stated that given the significance of banks for 
society, their objective should exceed the sole corporate goal of maximizing profit. Instead, they 
should be preoccupied with being a stable and subservient asset of society. Stable refers to being 
shockproof and consistent, while subservient is about offering all financial products necessary for 
citizens, firms and the economy (CSNB, 2013). In other words, the financial sector has to be a 
stable, consistent and trustworthy sector.  
Responsible conduct can be enforced through regulation. Before the crisis, banking 
regulation was, however, mainly driven by the ambition of optimizing competition to complete the 
European single market. Mutual recognition of inter alia products, services, licenses, suppliers and 
standards among Member States was vital for the establishment of the single market, and this 
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purpose encouraged EU policymakers in the 1980s to adopt the principle of home country control, 
which entailed the idea that a bank that was authorized in one EU Member State, became entitled 
to conduct business in all other Member States (Begg, 2009: 1112). Under this principle, a bank 
can generally act under the law of its home state, while conducting business in host states. Member 
States have the task of “authorizing and prudentially regulating their “home” financial services 
undertakings. Such home authorization must then be recognized throughout the rest of the single 
market without more, thus conferring a “single European passport” on the undertaking.” 
(Lomnicka, 2000: 324). Clearly, Member States had to agree on national regulatory standards by 
and large, but these were only minimum standards (Lomnicka, 2000: 324-325). 
Moreover, the banking industries in the EU were liberalized considerably during  a 
deregulation process in the 1990s (Chortareas et al., 2012: 292). Structural and conduct rules were 
replaced by prudential regulation on minimum capital adequacy. To facilitate financial integration, 
a Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) was established in the early 2000s, 
consisting of national supervisors of the banking industry, with the purpose of coordinating the 
regulation of banks in the EU (Begg, 2009: 1113). Banks were, thus, subjected to the rules of 
considerably differing national supervisory systems and authorities, increasing the complexity for 
banks to comply to different national systems, and hampering the possibility for national 
supervisors to introduce an integrated system of guidelines, regulation and supervision (Begg, 
2009: 1114). Reforms were carried out with great cautiousness as demanding rules would increase 
the regulatory burden and restrict banks in their activities and efficiency (Chortareas et al., 2012: 
292). Overall, the banking industry was subjected to a broad regulatory framework, but with the 
ambition to establish a single European market in their mind, policymakers shifted the focus of this 
framework from proper conduct in national markets to increased integration, global competition 
and liberalization. At the same time, the framework was not backed up with a coherent regulatory 
and supervisory framework, that applied equally in all Member States. 
The financial crisis of 2008 showed the consequences of an instable and not subservient 
banking sector. At the end of the 20th century, the introduction of a single European market, 
combined with deregulation of financial services had severe impact on the competition, 
concentration and efficiency in the financial sector: national boundaries were removed, and all 
European banks were suddenly confronted with substantially more market participants. As a result, 
an increasing number of national and international mergers took place and consumers were faced 
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with a limited group of large ‘system banks’ (Bikker & Groeneveld, 1998: 1; DNB, 2010, 
Underhill, 1997: 101-102). The general assumption shared by financialization scholars, is that 
banks are a significant element of the economic infrastructure and of financial stability, and without 
their intermediary role the economy would come to a halt (DNB, 2011: 6). Complicating the 
situation even more is the fact that these system banks were highly connected to the financial 
position of governments in multiple Member States. In some Member States, they owned up to 
25% of domestic government bonds. If these system banks would fail, they would be capable of 
bringing a country’s entire economy and government down with them. Their size and influence on 
economy made that system banks were considered to be ‘too big to fail’ (Boot, 2012: 110; DNB, 
2011; Stern & Feldman, 2004: 12). 
Furthermore, due to liberalization and globalization in the banking sector, national 
economies became interlocked and fluctuations in one economy were felt by connected economies 
as well. As a result of this development, states and banks ended up in a ‘financial trilemma’ 
(Schoenmaker, 2011): the decentralized, national systems of bank supervision were inadequate in 
an environment with a sizeable, globalizing banking sector and high interconnectedness among 
national banking systems, and between banking systems and the finances of sovereigns. During the 
crisis national authorities focused mainly on the survival of the national parts, while they neglected 
the integrated, international value of banks (De Haan et al., 2014: 23). 
Another way through which this interlocking took place, was through trade in financial 
products between financial institutions all over the world. This practice started in the U.S., as the 
FED systematically lowered their interest rate, and investors sought more profitable investment 
options. Banks offered a solution by selling Collateralized Debt Obligations, consisting of 
combinations of mortgages with differing risk profiles. As demand for these more profitable 
products increased, banks put pressure on the mortgage providers to provide more citizens with 
loans, so they could sell more financial products.4 This led to impecunious civilians with mortgages 
they could not pay off. Those mortgages were, then, bundled in unfathomable, high-risk packages 
and resold on financial markets to other banks and financial institutions, exposing a broad network 
of financial institutions to the risks of these packages. The wide distribution of loans and the 
uncertainty about the actual risks accompanying the packages and which banks possessed the risky 
packages, made banks distrusting towards each other. As a result, banks no longer provided loans 
                                                 
4 Jarvis, J. (2012), ‘The Crisis of Credit Visualized’, on: http://www.crisisofcredit.com/ (visited on 6-4-2016). 
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to each other, paralyzing the entire capital market and eventually causing the bankruptcy of 
investment bank Lehman Brothers in 2008 – generally seen as the launch of the crisis – and 
subsequently followed by the bankruptcy of a number of other firms, take-overs and financial aid 
for numerous financial institutions (Beetsma & Eijffinger, 2008: 58; Hazeu, 2011: 138-141). 
After the crisis, banks have been condemned for ignoring their societal function and for 
their shadiness and laxity in providing consumers with mortgages they could not afford. Multiple 
shortcomings came to the surface in the banking industry. First, the liberalization of the European 
financial sector led to a more oligopolistic market with less, and bigger banks that became trapped 
in cross-border financial networks. Following standard economic theories, oligopolistic markets 
induce less product variation for consumers and less incentive to work efficient for banks (Baarsma 
et al., 2010: 26-27). Second, the creation of sketchy and complex financial products caused a 
decrease in the transparency of banking activities for consumers, and, consequently, increased 
information asymmetry, uncertainty and incomplete trust. As a result of the asymmetry, concerns 
could arise as profit-maximizing banks could perversely employ their knowledge advantage to 
offer expensive financial products to consumers, who ignorantly accepted offers they actually 
could not afford, as they lacked the information necessary and made sub-optimal choices (Akerlof, 
1970; Baarsma et al., 2010: 28; Casu & Giradone, 2006: 10-12; CSNB, 2013: 18-19). Lastly, in 
line with Akerlof’s moral hazard, their ‘too-big-to-fail’ status induced banks to conduct more 
hazardous, as they knew governments would intervene in case of financial emergency. 
Credit Rating Agencies 
Other providers of financial services that were accused of having a blameful role in the outbreak 
of the crisis, were CRAs. Their operations and their role in the crisis are, however, less known by 
the general public. Since the start of the 1900s, CRAs have adopted a key role in the financial 
system. They have two key functions: primarily, they collect financial statistics about firms, 
transform these into a risk estimation portrayed by a rating, and sell them to all kinds of investors 
(McClintock Ekins & Calabria, 2012: 6). As such, they assess the creditworthiness and solvency 
of borrowers – financial and non-financial firms, and governments – autonomously, and provide 
this information to financial market participants and regulators. Second, CRAs provide monitoring 
services for issuers to implicitly push them towards corrective actions (De Haan & Ambtenbrink, 
2011: 1-3). Their services facilitate faster, better and more transparent matches between borrowers 
and loaners, as they diminish information asymmetries between banks and investors, and reduce 
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investors’ opportunity and transaction costs (Casu & Girardone, 2006: 6; Shahzad, 2013: 2; Stiglitz 
& Weiss, 1981: 408-409). Overall, CRAs enhance the smoothness of the market (De Haan & 
Ambtenbrink, 2011: 1-2; Kuhner, 2001). 
 CRAs adopt a function that Bossone (1999: 23-24) recommended for the diminution of 
information asymmetries and incomplete trust problems. However, he argued that governments 
should take a leading role in structuring such a system of private information providers. Although 
regulation of CRAs had been on the table in the EU since the late 1990s, the pre-crisis regulatory 
framework of CRAs was chiefly based on self-regulation, within a pre-determined bandwidth 
(Utzig, 2010: 1, 8). This bandwidth was laid down in the IOSCO code, which was the Code of 
Conduct Fundamentals for CRAs and aimed at ensuring the transparency, quality and integrity of 
the rating process. The code was composed of general rules, while methodological details were left 
to the CRAs themselves and sanction mechanisms were omitted (Utzig, 2010: 7).   
 On the EU-level, a Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) – composed of 
the national supervisors of CRAs – and a group of European Securities Markets Experts (ESME) 
functioned as advisors of the European Commission on CRA regulation, but in the period between 
2005 and the moment of the eruption of the crisis both solely recommended maintaining voluntary 
and self-regulatory frameworks (Utzig, 2010: 8-9). Compliance to the voluntary framework was 
not all too demanding for CRAs. For instance, elements of the framework were an annual meeting 
between CESR and the CRAs, the obligation for CRAs to inform national members of CESR in 
case of a substantial incident with issuers, and a published annual letter to CESR, outlining the 
degree of compliance to the IOSCO code (Utzig, 2010: 8). Besides, CRAs had to comply to criteria 
to be recognized as a formal external credit assessment institution. These criteria entailed the 
obligation for objective ratings, the review of ratings and general information on the methodology 
of ratings (Utzig, 2010: 9). Overall, this scheme was predominantly based on voluntary compliance 
to self-regulation consisting of undemanding criteria for participation and compliance.  
 Some doubts have risen regarding how beneficial the role and significance of CRAs is, 
especially regarding their autonomy and lack of regulation. Due to their specialized knowledge and 
influential position in the worldwide economy, CRAs power and authority has risen to humongous 
proportions. Friedman illustrated it strikingly: “There are two superpowers in the world today: The 
U.S. and Moody’s bond rating service. And, believe me, it’s not clear sometimes who is more 
powerful.” (Friedman in: Committee on Governmental Affairs, 2002).  
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Remarkably, the CRA sector has never had more than three dominant players. White (2002: 
41-42) suggests two reasons for this oligopolistic market structure: first, network effects might 
explain why firms keep returning to the same small group of CRAs. Second, regulatory restrictions 
brought into force by the U.S. government might give an explanation, as they decide who can be a 
certified CRA in the U.S.. Being a certified, gives the three biggest CRAs regulatory benefits – or 
‘regulatory licenses’ as Partnoy (2006: 60) calls them – which provides them with economic rents, 
that persist even when they underperform. Because CRAs were ‘invented’ in the U.S., American 
CRAs had an advantage when the market expanded to other parts of the world, for example Europe, 
and they could easily take on a dominant role there as well, resulting in a worldwide oligopolistic 
market structure (White, 2002: 44).5  
Mainly, their authoritative position, importance and concentration, raise significant public 
policy worries (Pinto, 2006: 341-343). U.S. Senator Lieberman stated in 2002 that governments 
depend on CRA ratings, and the specific knowledge and access to information that CRAs possess 
(Committee on Governmental Affairs, 2002: 1-2). For example, ratings were used as a policy 
instrument in international treaties, like the Basel II agreements (De Haan & Ambtenbrink, 2011: 
1). Moreover, CRAs’ sphere of influence goes beyond policymakers, and entails the entire 
economy. Even issuing firms and experienced investors depend on CRA disclosures to a large 
extent. Both parties rely on ratings and expect to gain profit from them: issuers profit from ratings, 
because they present simplifications of complex information to investors in the shape of a rating, 
while thereby not disclosing the underlying confidential firm details to the public (Kliger & Sarig, 
2000: 2899). On the other hand, investors receive information on the creditworthiness of firms, 
which they could not obtain or understand individually. As such, the ratings are investors’ proxy 
signs of reality. They purchase this information under the perception that CRAs are neutral in their 
judgment (Shahzad, 2013: 10-11; Treacy & Carey, 2000: 185). Therefore, trust in CRA ratings is 
crucial in the financial sector, and given its wide use, it is crucial to the entire economy. 
Their authority and concentration grants CRAs with the status of ‘quasi-regulatory’ agency, 
a position that is not typically borne by private, profit-seeking firms. A role with such social 
responsibility demands a public perspective on ‘determining capital requirements for financial 
institutions, a crucial aspect of the prudential supervision and thus ultimately of financial stability 
                                                 
5 According to De Haan & Ambtenbrink (2011: 6), there were around 150 CRAs a few years ago, with the top three 
competitors sharing approximately 95 percent of the market – Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (40 percent each) and Fitch (15 
percent). 
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as such’ (De Haan & Ambtenbrink, 2011: 32). It is remarkable to see that non-governmental, 
private firms managed to obtain such a significant influence on the economy, and it might raise 
questions as to how governments have let this happen. Moreover, the dependability on CRA 
disclosures was so great that it implicitly led to conflicts of interest, which had consequences that 
were influential in the outbreak of the crisis.  
Until the late 1970s, CRAs received revenue from the sale of publications and from 
investors, but when the demand for ratings increased, CRAs adjusted their income model to an 
‘issuer pays’-fee, in which issuing firms pay CRAs to be rated by them. In other words, CRAs 
became profit-seeking, private firms, who are paid by the parties they assess (Shahzad, 2013: 10-
11). Combined with the oligopolistic nature of the CRA market, this further restricted possible 
inclinations of CRAs to rate firms (their clients) all to rigorous (DNB, 2010: 84; Hunt, 2009: 32). 
The limited number of participants in the CRA sector created incentives for firms to play off the 
CRAs against each other by shopping among the CRAs for the highest ratings, leaving CRAs in a 
situation where they had to adjust their ratings in favor of these firms in order to retain or attract 
them as a client (Pagano & Volpin, 2010; Shahzad, 2013). On the other hand, it seems that CRAs 
also attempted to manipulate the parties they assessed, by publishing unsolicited ratings. These 
unrequested ratings were significantly lower than requested ratings that were paid for by firms, and 
this incentivized firms to purchase ratings at a CRA to receive higher ratings (Poon, 2003).   
 Market failures in the CRA sector were another reason for their role in the crisis. The sector 
does not have a perfect competitive market in the neoclassical fashion, with perfect information 
and rationality. Two types of violations are mentioned frequently in scientific literature. First, the 
main market failure in the financial sector arises from the fact that consumers do not dispose of 
perfect information and cannot obtain new information without facing considerable opportunity 
costs. Because of this failure, CRAs – who evidently are more capable of determining the 
creditworthiness of firms – possessed an information advantage over the investors. Financial 
institutions abused their information advantage to exploit ill-informed consumers and gamble with 
resources of others. Specifically, CRAs did not accurately lower the ratings of their clients, and 
thereby provided consumers with unjust images of the riskiness of investing in a given firm or state 
(Armstrong, 2012: 4-9; Arrow, 1973; Hellmann et al., 2000: 147-150, Hunt & Morgan, 1995: 2-
3). Another market failure arises from the fact that monopoly power seems present in the CRA 
sector. Supported by the certification-regulation in the U.S., an oligopolistic market structure was 
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initiated and maintained for a long time (Partnoy, 2006: 60-61). The fact that despite CRAs’ 
underperformance, no new competitors were able to successfully enter the market suggests at least 
some form of collaborative, monopoly power for the three influential CRAs (Armstrong, 2012: 4-
9; Arrow, 1973; Hellmann et al., 2000: 147-150, Hunt & Morgan, 1995: 2-3).  
 Finally, the lack of accountability of CRAs is frequently mentioned as a problem in the 
institutional design of the financial sector (Blumberg et al., 2011; Hill, 2004: 90). CRAs have 
acquired a powerful position in the economy over the last century, with governments and large 
corporations depending on their publications for a trustworthy image to investors. Consumers 
depend on their assessments of the creditworthiness of issuers, while political, international and 
governmental institutions use their knowledge and assessments as a policy tool in regulations. Such 
an influential role requires a certain form of social awareness that cannot reasonably be desired 
from purely private, profit-seeking firms (De Haan & Ambtenbrink, 2011: 32, Friedman: 1970). 
As Bossone (1999: 23-24) advocated, governments should adopt a facilitating role in providing the 
structure for private business information providers, because when considering, for instance, the 
threat of possible shopping for better ratings, that CRAs are confronted with, and the significant 
lower scores CRAs publish in unsolicited ratings, it is sensible to conclude that in reality it indeed 
turned out unreasonable to expect such a societal role of for-profit CRAs. 
4.2 Earlier attempts to reform financial sector supervision 
Establishing a single European financial market that would bring together all financial institutions 
with operations in the EU, has long been one of the key purposes of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) (Jappelli & Pagano, 2008: 2-3). Since the ECB was founded in 1998, a debate 
emerged around what type of financial supervision was most suited to oversee the single market in 
the EU-zone (Masciandaro et al., 2011: 204). The idea that the regulation should increasingly 
become based on (trans-)national regulatory power existed way before the economic crisis took 
place. Predominantly, debate in academic and policy circles took place between two parties: on the 
one hand, the proponents of coordination among national supervisors in the financial sector, and 
on the other hand, the proponents of more centralized, European approaches (Masciandaro et al., 
2009: 3). These opposing ideas recurred in debates on supervision of financial institutions from the 
earlier 2000s (García Alcubilla & Ruiz del Pozo, 2012: 47). 
 To come to concrete proposals on how supervision of integrated financial markets had to 
be structured, the European Commission issued the Financial Services Action Plan in 1999 (Alford, 
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2006: 389). As part of this plan, a process for fast passage of financial sector regulation was 
adopted, especially to reform the supervision of the European securities markets quickly, and a 
Committee of Wise Men – chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy – was set up by the EU’s Economic 
and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) in July 2000 to provide recommendations on how passage could 
be accelerated (Commission, 2001: 1). The Committee concluded that EU-wide regulation was 
necessary for integration of financial markets, and that the legislative process in the EU was too 
time-consuming for dynamic and global financial markets (Alford, 2006: 398). The Lamfalussy 
Committee proposed a four-level framework for accelerated policymaking, and initiated the 
establishment of three specialized committees that could prepare the implementation of technical 
measures. These were the CEBS, the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Supervisors (CEIOPS) and the CESR (Commission, 2007). 
 The Lamfalussy process is observed as the predecessor of the post-crisis financial 
supervision reform. With regard to the role that trust played in this process, it can be concluded 
that although the report mentioned the importance of involvement of consumers and users, it only 
touched upon the importance of confidence in the financial sector and its institutions evasively, 
when stating that trust should be one of eight principles on which financial sector regulation should 
be based (Commission, 2001: 22). Overall, the key motive of the Lamfalussy reform cannot be 
found in ensuring societal trust in the financial system. Rather, it can be found in a process of 
designing a technical solution for a system of regulatory passage that can answer effectively to the 
dynamic, and rapidly expanding and globalizing financial markets and the coherent need for swift 
EU-wide regulation in the financial sector. This could then increase competitiveness and achieve a 
better allocation of financial services at lower cost (Council, 2000).  
 All in all, the Lamfalussy report did not succeed in realizing a profound system of 
supervision to ensure stability within the European financial system. Berès, Chairwoman of the 
Parliamentary Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, argued: “The debate on the new 
supervisory architecture in Europe is not a new one, it has been on the table since Baron 
Lamfalussy’s work, but the crisis has given us the political momentum and also the responsibility 
to tackle it. It remains delicate and sensitive.”6 The impact of the crisis brought financial institutions 
on the brink of disaster and introduced a new sense of urgency to the debate. It led to the shared 
belief that the existing system fell short, opening a window of opportunity for concrete 
                                                 
6 Berès, P. (2009), Speech at High-Level Conference ‘Towards a new supervisory architecture in Europe’, Brussels, 7 May. 
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reassessment of the financial sector’s supervisory framework. Led by the Commission, multiple 
stakeholders – ranging from national and international policymakers to commissions and expert 
groups (García Alcubilla & Ruiz del Pozo, 2012: 47-50; Hiss & Nagel, 2014: 134-137) – were 
involved in this debate. The next sections reveal whether policymakers in the post-crisis attempts 
did acknowledge the concept of trust during the policy process. 
4.3 A post-crisis economy without trust 
By now it is generally accepted in academic and professional circles that the recent financial crisis 
represented giant market failures. While financial markets failed in their tasks of managing and 
distributing risk, and effectively allocating capital for investment, government institutions failed to 
provide a reliable monitoring function and steer financial activities in a socially desirable direction. 
However, neoclassic reasoning alone is not capable of explaining the crash (Tonkiss, 2009: 196). 
As Sapienza and Zingales (2012: 123) formulate it:  
“Something important was destroyed in the last few months of 2008. It is an asset crucial to production, 
even if it is not made of bricks and mortar. While this asset does not enter standard national account statistics or 
standard economic models, it is so crucial to development that its absence – according to Nobel laureate Kenneth 
Arrow – is the cause of much of the economic backwardness in the world. This asset is trust.” 
Overall, the 2008 crisis had a significant impact on the public reputation of financial 
institutions, as they were held responsible for the eruption of the crisis by a large share of 
academics, political actors and citizens (Swedberg, 2010b: 91). In a public speech, ECB Board 
Member Lautenschläger even argued “that banks, bankers and the whole industry are experiencing 
one of the worst crises of confidence ever”.7 To speak in metaphorical terms, the financial industry 
applied an objectionable conduct, which has striking similarities to the ‘rational human’ Hardin 
(1968) described in his ‘Tragedy of the Commons’: financial firms conscienceless maximized their 
profits, without bearing in mind the possible societal consequences of their acts, and the freedom 
they had to act on the market (in excess of state supervision), brought – to speak in the words of 
Hardin – ruin to us all.  
 When the crisis erupted, the idea that supervision in the financial sector was needed, was 
widely supported in European society, and was acknowledged as well by EU policymaking 
institutions. Just days after the default of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the President of the 
                                                 
7 Lautenschläger, S. (2015), Reintegrating the banking sector into society: earning and re-establishing trust, Speech at the 
7th International Banking Conference ‘Tomorrow’s bank business model – How far are we from the new equilibrium’, Milan, 
September 28. 
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European Commission, Barroso was one of the first to speak publicly about the unfolded situation. 
He stated that the crisis and its impact on the European community were severe. To tackle the 
problems at hand and “to make sure that stability and confidence will return” the financial system 
needed not only resolutions in the form of liquidity, but also in credibility, through a well-
structured, long-term and truly European governance system in the financial sector, which would 
bring together national supervisors with EU institutions and regulators.8 During a debate with the 
Council and the Parliament on 8 October 2008, Barroso presented an advanced schedule towards 
resolving the unfolding issue, in which he specifically emphasized the importance of coordination 
between the most relevant actors, financial institutions, supervisors, the Commission, national 
central banks and the European Central Bank.9  
Building on globalization and financialization arguments, Barroso argued that a number of 
financial institutions in the EU were active in no less than fifteen Member States, while supervision 
still took place only at the national level. Banks had to adjust to different regulatory frameworks in 
each Member States, while national supervisors could not properly monitor institutions whose 
operations extended beyond national borders. Barroso stated that it would make “sense to remove 
the mismatch between a continental-scale market and national systems of supervision”, and he, 
therefore, proposed to establish a new regulatory framework in the financial sector with EU level 
supervision, to bring stability and minimize future risks. A High-Level Group – led by former IMF-
boss Jacques de Larosière – was launched by Barroso to advise on the transformation of national 
financial sector supervision into a collaborative European system of supervision.10 This system 
would have to ensure the efficient functioning of markets, European co-operation on financial 
supervision, prudential soundness, early warning mechanisms and crisis management. 
On behalf of the Council, President-in-Office Jouyet agreed with the points made by 
Barroso and the decision to launch a High-Level Group. He argued that there were three main 
priorities: the creation of a cross-border institutional system, the development of a more sustainable 
model for growth and “the return of confidence (…) so that our fellow citizens feel more protected 
                                                 
8 Barroso, J.M.D. (2008a), ‘Remarks of President Barroso on financial crisis’, Speech 08/479, Press Conference, Brussels, 1 
October. 
9 Contribution by President Barroso in a debate on the Preparation of the European Council , including the situation of the 
global financial system on 8 October, 2008. A report of the debate is published at: European Parliament (2008), ‘Debates - 
CRE 08/10/2008 – 14’, on: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20081008&secondRef=ITEM-
014&format=XML&language=EN (visited on 23-1-2017).  
10 Idem. 
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in relation to Europe”.11 In his opinion, confidence could only be regained through reactive and 
better adapted regulation of the financial sector. MEPs broadly approved the call for a coordinated 
European solution. For instance, MEP Daul called upon Member States to act in a coordinated 
manner: “We need concerted action; we need courage and solidarity from all twenty-seven Member 
States to inject confidence into our economy again.”12 
On behalf of the Socialists, MEP Schulz blamed traditional capitalism for the crisis: “For 
years here we have had to listen to the neoliberal dogma that the market would sort everything out. 
For years we have been told that the effects generated by the market would ‘trickle down’ and that 
in the end, everyone would benefit. What has actually happened is that those who were supposed 
to benefit from all this, the taxpayers, are having to foot the bill.”13 Nonetheless, he supported the 
proposals: “The measures are the correct ones – and you are right, they must be coordinated 
throughout Europe – because we need to establish confidence and regain trust, because we need to 
conquer fear, otherwise this fear will become a self-fulfilling prophecy and merely accelerate the 
collapse that we are trying to avoid. We support these measures, too, but let me add this: the house 
that has just burnt down cannot be rebuilt just as it was before. The new house must be different. 
It must be built on a firm foundation, a foundation with clear rules.” With his argument, Schulz 
emphasized the essence of modern economics: the old-fashion theoretical perspective of an 
invisible hand that evokes optimal allocation and efficiency, building on ideas of costless and 
complete information and the absence of uncertainty, had to be replaced by a new perspective 
resting on foundations that put fear and confidence at the core.  
 On the other hand, Liberal Democrats, like MEP Watson, disagreed with the argument that 
traditional capitalism was to blame for the eruption of the crisis: “There are some who think they 
can now tap-dance on the grave of capitalism (…) What we are witnessing is not the failure of the 
market economy. Rather it is the excesses of unfettered, ineffectively regulated markets. Financial 
markets currently owe less to Adam Smith than to the Cincinnati Kid. The greed of individual 
bankers, traders and short-sellers is certainly to blame, but so too is the failure of governments to 
ensure transparency and honesty in their dealings.”14 Still, the Liberal Democrats supported the 
same solution to the crisis: “‘Decent capitalism needs effective public policy. Profit-seeking is the 
                                                 
11 Idem, contribution by President-in-Office of the Council Jouyet. 
12 Idem, contribution by MEP Daul. 
13 Idem, contribution by MEP Schulz. 
14 Idem, contribution by MEP Watson. 
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essence of a market economy, but when everything is for sale, social cohesion melts and the system 
breaks down.’ Europe was slow to heed such worries. It must now do what it can to put that system 
back to business. (…) Similarly, we need a pan-European financial services authority to maintain 
order and transparency between financial institutions.” 
Altogether, although Socialists and Liberal Democrats disagreed on the cause of lacking 
trust – the former blamed the market economy for the disappearance of trust, while the latter mainly 
pointed at the inadequacy of the regulatory framework for the absence of trust – both agreed on the 
perspective that trust and transparency had disappeared, and had to be restored through a 
transnational supervisory framework.  
As a result, Barroso’s approach was approved a few days later by the Eurogroup – 
composed of the Heads of State of all Euro-countries – who saw that “the consequences of the 
current financial market crisis jeopardize the crucial economic role of the financial system” and 
further action was urgently needed (Eurogroup, 2008: 1). The European Council – uniting the 
Heads of State of all EU-Member States – aligned itself with the Eurogroup. They expressed the 
same urgency to restore confidence in the financial system, because its proper functioning would 
provide the appropriate conditions for re-establishing the efficient financing of the economy 
(European Council, 2008). Moreover, the Council spoke out a firm call for responsibility to 
financial institutions, in order to enable the re-establishment of public confidence. Barroso was 
grateful for the swift responses of the Council, Eurogroup and Parliament, and supported their 
emphasis on the vital role of trust in re-establishing stability and sustainability in the financial 
markets: “We all have (…) to put an end to excessive market pessimism, and establish a more 
permanent return of confidence”.15 During discussions within the Commission in October, the 
Commissioners highlighted “the importance of maintaining the confidence of the markets and of 
explaining to the public the reason for the urgent measures taken at national and Community level”. 
Furthermore, the Commissioners emphasized that “transparency towards ordinary citizens had to 
be the prime objective of any proposed initiative on financial products (…) and financial 
supervision” (Commission, 2008b: 24). At the end of October 2008, the Commission bundled its 
approach to recovery in a communication, which underlined the necessity of a new financial market 
                                                 
15 Barroso, J.M.D. (2008b), ‘Creating a European Response to a Global Crisis’, Speech 08/525 at European Parliament of 
Enterprises, Brussels, 14 October. 
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architecture at the EU level with reinforced regulation and supervision of financial institutions to 
regain societal trust in the sector (Commission, 2008c). 
Overall, EU policymaking institutions captured the notion of the importance of confidence 
in economic context particularly well in their first comprehension of the causes and consequences 
of the crisis. Despite disagreement between Socialists and Liberal Democrats on the exact causes 
of the crisis – either the traditional capitalist system itself was to blame or the regulation of this 
system – policymaking institutions shared the common belief in their definition of the problems 
that trust had evaporated in the lead-in period of the policy process, and eventually caused the 
crisis. They observed it as a result of failure on the side of both the government and financial 
institutions. Furthermore, all expressed a clear focus on a rapid and radical restructuring of the 
supervision framework of financial institutions, and explicitly mentioned restoring trust throughout 
all their speeches and publications as the main objective in the policy process to come.  
4.4 The role of trust in the policy process of the ESFS 
The path of the policy process for revision of financial sector regulation and supervision in the 
European Union was determined to a great extent by the group of high-level European financial 
sector specialists, chaired by Jacques de Larosière. The advice published by the De Larosière group 
in February of 2009 was a blueprint for the reform realized in 2011, as it entailed plans for the 
establishment of a European system of supervisors, based on three collaborating, new European 
authorities that would supervise the banking, insurance and securities markets (Commission, 
2009a: 48-50). These would replace three less powerful Committees that oversaw the banking, 
insurance and securities markets before the crisis – respectively the CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR. 
 In their important report, the group saw the need for recovering trust in the financial sector 
and its institutions, and gave it a place at the center of the advices in their report. De Larosière 
identified the same problems in the financial sector as mentioned early in this chapter, regarding 
unconscionable financial institutions that misused the complexity of the market and their coherent 
information advantage, and a lack of risk management and transparency (Commission, 2009a: 7-
12). The group stressed both the importance of enhancing trust between financial institutions and 
between financial institutions and EU citizens. They emphasized that as its prime objective, 
supervision had to preserve financial stability and thereby “ensure confidence in the financial 
system as a whole and sufficient protection for the customers of financial services” (Commission, 
2009a: 38-39). Nonetheless, the De Larosière group also focused on traditional perspectives of 
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economic theory in their report. They argued that the new supervision system had to take into 
account “an important constraint which is to allow the financial industry to perform its allocative 
economic function with the greatest possible efficiency, and thereby contribute to sustainable 
economic growth” (Commission, 2009a: 39). The group underlined that supervision should mainly 
focus on encouraging smooth functioning markets and competitiveness, while poor supervisors or 
supervision rules would translate into costs for the financial sector, taxpayers and the entire 
economy. Consequently, the framework should be carriedout “as effectively as possible and at the 
lowest possible cost” (Commission, 2009a: 39). 
A week after the publication of the De Larosière report in February 2009, the Commission 
sent out a communication in which it aligned itself with practically all findings and 
recommendations of the group, and spoke out the ambition to move forward with developing 
proposals for the suggested new European financial supervision system, building on the 
recommendations of De Larosière report (Commission, 2009b: 5-6, 19). They planned to prepare 
proposals on the reform of financial sector regulation and supervision within three months. These 
policy proposals would be based on consultation of the most important stakeholders, such as the 
European Parliament, heads of state of EU Member States, European committees and institutions 
with expert knowledge in the field of financial institutions, and interested parties. 
European Parliament 
Briefly after the Commission’s publication, the Parliament welcomed it predominantly with words 
of praise. In one of the first debates, MEP Belès even stated that: “This report (The De Larosière 
Report, red.) has been adopted unanimously, even though the group was composed of cultures and 
people of very different origins. The European consensus that we have sought for years has 
therefore been found”.16 The Parliament approved the short-term measures adopted to restore 
confidence to the financial system. However, it also recalled “that those emergency measures are 
insufficient to tackle some of the fundamental problems at the source of the crisis”.17 In later 
debates on the subject of financial supervision in the Parliament, re-establishing citizen confidence 
in the financial system was mentioned regularly as the overarching, prime objective of all measures. 
                                                 
16 Contribution by MEP Berès in a debate on the Preparation of the European Council of 19-20 March 2008 – European 
Economic Recovery Plan on 11 March, 2009. A report of the debate is published at: European Parliament (2009a), ‘Debates 
- CRE 11/03/2009 – 3’, on: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20090311+ITEM-
003+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-028 (visited on 9-1-2017). 
17 European Parliament Resolution on a European Economic Recovery Plan, 2009 OJ C 16/1. 
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For instance, MEP Muscardini – representing the political group Union for Europe of the Nations 
– showed a clear understanding of the role of confidence in the financial sector, and stressed the 
importance of empowering citizens to regain their trust: “There are many goals to be reached: 
restoring confidence, supporting growth and protecting employment”.18 Furthermore, she 
emphasized the need for economic policy to govern financial markets and their products, and limit 
financial institutions in their possibilities to create “an escalation of unprecedented indebtedness”.  
MEP Daul of the European Christian Democrats spoke out the same desire for rebuilding 
trust through governmental intervention, while he also underlined the financialization-argument of 
the essentiality of the financial sector for the global economy: “This programme, which aims to 
restore credit, growth and employment, should give us the time needed to stabilise the markets and, 
above all, to restore confidence in the global economy. (…) One of the main problems in the 
financial sector was the lack of financial regulation and supervision. The fact is, we will not be able 
to restore the confidence of our fellow citizens in the economy until we have restored confidence 
in our financial system. To do so, we must extend regulation and supervision to all financial 
institutions”.19 Daul’s fellow party member Gauzès supported his stance: “I would like to stress 
that the return of confidence, which is the real objective of all the measures taken, obviously hinges 
on better regulation, especially of the financial system. However, we must also take into account 
the fears of our fellow citizens and respond positively to them. We should give them realistic 
messages of hope. Unless we improve the morale of our fellow citizens, we will not restore 
consumer confidence, without which economic recovery will not be possible.”20 Furthermore, in 
the legal content of its resolutions, the European parliament called the lack of confidence in 
financial and capital markets the main challenge to be met in countering the downturn in the 
international and European economy, and the Parliament explicitly stressed “the importance of 
rebuilding confidence in the financial sector, which is the key to restoring lending to the real 
economy as well as international capital flows”.21  
                                                 
18 Contribution by MEP Muscardini in a debate on Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies in the European Parliament on 
April 22, 2009. A report of the debate is published at: European Parliament (2009b), ‘Debates - CRE 22/04/2009 – 4’, on: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20090422+ITEM-
004+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=HR (visited on 9-1-2017). 
19 Contributions by Daul during a debate on the Conclusions of the G20 Summit on April 23, 2009. A report of the debate is 
published at: European Parliament (2009c), ‘Debates - CRE 23/04/2009 - 13’, on: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20090423&secondRef=ITEM-
013&format=XML&language=EN (visited on 9-1-2017). 
20 Idem, contribution by Gauzès. 
21 European Parliament Resolution of 24 April 2009 on the London G20 Summit of 2 April 2009. 
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Overall, the Parliament showed a clear understanding of the concept of confidence as set out by 
contemporary economic scholars. Rather than urging for intervention methods aimed at traditional 
economic purposes, like restoring perfect competition in the financial sector to safeguard 
completely efficient markets, the importance of interventions as an instrument to bring back trust 
in the sector, economy and even society – while potentially requiring financial institutions to 
comply with more demanding rules that lower their efficiency – was emphasized. Furthermore, the 
earlier disagreement among political parties concerning the causes of the crisis, had vanished. As 
MEP Dăianu stated: “People have realised that this crisis is not of a cyclical nature and that a 
thorough overhaul of the regulation and supervision of financial markets is badly needed.”22 
Council 
During the Brussels European Council of 19 and 20 March of 2009, the Council published a short 
expression of commitment to the Commission’s communication. In particular, they underwrote the 
goal of restoring confidence and the proper functioning of the financial market, while emphasizing 
the modern economic stance towards confidence in economic context, which they observed as “an 
indispensable precondition for the way out of the current financial and economic crisis” (European 
Council, 2009a: 2). The Council called the report of De Larosière the basis for action and endorsed 
in full the mentioned weaknesses of the current system and the planned broad structure for reform 
(European Council, 2009a: 2-3). Also, the Council emphasized its willingness to operate quickly 
once the Commission presented proposals, and urged the Parliament to do so as well, given the 
importance to react swiftly to the unfolded situation. 
Relevant stakeholders  
Interested parties were invited by the Commission to submit feedback and comments within a 
month after their communication. This process of public consultation gave the Commission insight 
in society’s faith and trust in the new supervisory and regulatory framework. Overall, 116 
submissions were received, mainly from institutions involved in the process, or active in the 
financial sector. The submissions were cautiously positive about the new framework and its ability 
                                                 
22 Contribution by MEP Dăianu in a debate on Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies in the European Parliament on April 
22, 2009. A report of the debate is published at: European Parliament (2009b), ‘Debates - CRE 22/04/2009 – 4’, on: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20090422+ITEM-
004+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=HR (visited on 9-1-2017). 
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to stabilize the financial sector, although more detailed plans were demanded.23   
 Another way in which stakeholders were involved in the Commission’s preparation of 
policy proposals, was through a High-Level Conference organized by the Commission in May 
2009. At this conference, called ‘Towards a new supervisory architecture in Europe’, influential 
stakeholders came together and discussed the new supervisory framework.24 Representatives of 
several interested and involved parties were present at the conference – among others presidents of 
national banks, members of the ECB, the De Larosière group and the Parliament, Director Generals 
and Commissioners of European Commissions, and Chairs of individual financial institutions, 
trade unions, consumer associations, and associations of financial institutions – to defend the 
interests of their constituency and reveal their preferences. The contributions and discussions 
presented were deemed of key significance by the Commission, as they were adopted by the 
College of Commissioners in their final proposal for the reform of the financial sector regulation.25 
In general, all stakeholders approved – in a varying degree of conviction – the broad idea 
for regulation and supervision of the financial sector, as suggested in the De Larosière Report. 
Representatives from European policymaking authorities, like the ECB, Commission and 
Parliament emphasized the importance of establishing a reform and highlighted technical issues to 
optimize the efficiency and effectivity of the new framework, for example by concretizing the need 
for smooth interplay between national and European supervisors.26 Participants from national 
authorities, like the Czech Ministry of Finance and the Italian central bank, had a similar focus in 
their contributions27. Specialized European institutions – like the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators and the Joint Committee on Financial Conglomerates – on the other hand, 
                                                 
23 Commission (2009c), ‘Summary of public submissions received on the proposals of the de Larosière report regarding 
financial supervision in Europe’, on: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2009/fin_supervision/summary_en.pdf (visited on 4-1-2017). 
24 Commission (2009d), ‘High-Level Conference: Towards a new supervisory architecture in Europe’, on: 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/docs/committees/supervision/070509programme_en.pdf (visited on 9-1-2017). 
25 Holmquist, J. (2009), Speech at High-Level Conference ‘Towards a new supervisory architecture in Europe, Brussels’, 7 
May. 
26 Berès, P. (2009), Speech at High-Level Conference ‘Towards a new supervisory architecture in Europe’, Brussels, 7 May. 
Buti, M. (2009), Bullet Points for Commissioner's Intervention, Speech at High-Level Conference ‘Towards a new 
supervisory architecture in Europe’, Brussels, 7 May. 
Grande, M. (2009), Ensuring adequate macro-prudential supervision in the EU, Speech at High-Level Conference ‘Towards 
a new supervisory architecture in Europe’, Brussels, 7 May. 
McCreevy, C. (2009), Speech/09/221, Keynote Speech at High-Level Conference ‘Towards a new supervisory architecture 
in Europe’, Brussels, 7 May. 
27 Carosio, G. (2009), Ensuring adequate macro-prudential supervision in the EU, Speech at High-Level Conference 
‘Towards a new supervisory architecture in Europe’, Brussels, 7 May. 
Król, J. (2009), Speech at High-Level Conference ‘Towards a new supervisory architecture in Europe’, Brussels, 7 May. 
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chiefly focused on technical details that were relevant for the niche in which they operate.28  
 European federations of private financial institutions – like the European Banking 
Federation, the Comité Européen des Assurances (European insurance firms), the London 
Investment Banking Association and the European Savings Banks Group – and the vice-Chairman 
of Deutsche Bank all predominantly guarded the interests of the private institutions they 
represented. They saw the need for interventions to establish transnationally coordinated 
supervision, but focused mainly on preserving an efficient and effectively functioning financial 
sector, for instance based on rational and technical instruments, like cost-benefit and impact 
analyses, and the protection of systemically-important financial institutions.29 
Overall, as opposed to the statements by the Commission and Council in the definition of 
the problem, the contributions largely avoided drawing specific attention to the importance of trust 
for the financial system and how to establish it. Rather, the policymakers and stakeholders focused 
almost entirely on economic concepts like efficiency, effectivity, and (transaction) cost reduction. 
Except for two organizations, UNI-Europa Finance – a European trade union organization in the 
finance industries – and FIN-USE – an expert forum in the area of financial services focused on 
strengthening the role of consumers and small businesses in the development of the EU financial 
services sector – were more concerned with the concept of citizen trust. In line with modern 
economic arguments, they wanted to ensure its presence in the context of financial product markets. 
Oliver Roethig from UNI-Europa Finance emphasized the need for increased transparency 
in financial supervision, in order for finance companies, public authorities and workers to enhance 
public trust in financial markets.30 Not just regulators and the industry should be involved, but all 
stakeholders. He proposed the inclusion of consumers and worker unions in the supervisory regime 
to force the return of business ethics, responsible government and financial institutions that bear in 
                                                 
28 Brady, P. (2009), Speech at High-Level Conference ‘Towards a new supervisory architecture in Europe’, Brussels, 7 May. 
Wymeersch, E. (2009), Speech at High-Level Conference ‘Towards a new supervisory architecture in Europe’, Brussels, 7 
May. 
29 Knight, M.D. (2009), Ensuring adequate macro-prudential supervision in the EU, Speech at High-Level Conference 
‘Towards a new supervisory architecture in Europe’, Brussels, 7 May. 
Koller, M. (2009), The view of the insurance industry, Speech at High-Level Conference ‘Towards a new supervisory 
architecture in Europe’, Brussels, 7 May. 
Obolensky, A. (2009), Speech at High-Level Conference ‘Towards a new supervisory architecture in Europe’, Brussels, 7 
May. 
Schackmann-Fallis, K. (2009), ESBG’s view on the de Larosière report, Speech at High-Level Conference ‘Towards a new 
supervisory architecture in Europe’, Brussels, 7 May. 
Taylor, J. (2009), Speech at High-Level Conference ‘Towards a new supervisory architecture in Europe’, Brussels, 7 May. 
30 Roethig, O. (2009), Speech at High-Level Conference ‘Towards a new supervisory architecture in Europe’, Brussels, 7 
May. 
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mind their societal function. The argument of FIN-USE Chairman Zunzunegui was highly 
similar.31 Although he approved De Larosière’s report, he argued that the new system should not 
exclusively focus on effectivity and efficiency. Other prominent objectives should be the 
recovering of trust and confidence, and amplifying the system of protection of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) and consumers. Zunzunegui mentioned a lack of consumer voice and 
representation as one of the key causes of the crisis, and recommended to improve the 
representation of SMEs and consumers. For example, he suggested board seats and consultative 
panels for representatives of SMEs and consumers, to enhance ethic governance and the reliability 
of the financial sector and its supervision. 
A conference that partly addressed the same subject was organized by the EU a week later. 
At this ‘Brussels Economic Forum’, five representatives from international and European 
organizations, like IMF, the ECB, the Bank for International Settlement and the Bank of Estonia, 
discussed the necessity of a new framework for the financial sector. Their contributions resembled 
the ones from representatives of European policymaking authorities at the conference discussed 
above. While they mentioned explicitly the necessity of establishing a new and more demanding 
regulatory framework to re-stabilize the financial system, they addressed this objective mainly in 
terms of optimization of the efficiency and effectivity of new regulation, instead of in terms of 
trust.32 
Proposals from the European Commission 
With expert advice from a considerable pool of relevant stakeholders at its disposal, the 
Commission (2009e) published a new communication document at the end of May 2009. This 
document contained a concrete proposal for a system of European financial supervision, build on 
the ideas set out in the De Larosière report. It appointed the nationally-based supervisory models 
that lagged behind the interconnected reality of the EU’s financial markets as the key failure 
exposed by the crisis, causing a loss of trust in financial institutions. As in earlier publications, the 
                                                 
31 Zunzunegui, F. (2009), The view of the consumers, Speech at High-Level Conference ‘Towards a new supervisory 
architecture in Europe’, Brussels, 7 May. 
32 Angeloni, I. (2009), The Crisis and Global Imbalances, Speech at Brussels Economic Forum, May 15. 
Gudmundsson, M. (2009), Some key elements of future financial regulation, Speech at Brussels Economic Forum, May 15. 
Schinasi, G. (2009), Governance Challenges for Ensuring Global Financial Stability, Speech at Brussels Economic Forum, 
May 15. 
Sutt, A. (2009), Introductory Statement, Speech at Brussels Economic Forum, May 15. 
Viñals, J. (2009), Financial stability and the design of a new rule book, Speech at Brussels Economic Forum, May 15. 
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Commission (2009e: 2) explicitly emphasized that its main purpose was to restore confidence of 
citizens in financial institutions and the financial system, and of national supervisors in each other. 
Due to the urgency to secure trust and re-stabilize the financial system, an accelerated timetable 
for delivering the reform was proposed by the Commission (2009e: 3), to ensure a more rapid 
process than the pre-crisis attempts to restructure the regulation of financial institutions.  
To accomplish this objective, the three financial services committees that oversaw the 
European banking industry, insurance industry and securities industry were to be replaced by a new 
set of supervisors. The new structure consisted of both macro-prudential and micro-prudential 
supervision, as opposed to the old architecture which only entailed micro-prudential oversight. 
Macro-prudential oversight entails monitoring and assessing risks to the stability of the overall 
financial system, and was to be executed by a European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC). ESRC 
would compose of the ECB President, and representatives from micro-prudential EU supervision 
authorities, national central banks and the Commission. Its goal would be to tackle the systemic 
risk that comes along with financialization, and the increased interconnectedness of financial 
institutions with one another and with the economy and public finance (Commission, 2009e: 3-7). 
Furthermore, the Commission underlined the importance of distribution of and access to 
information for the ESRC, and it emphasized that relevant information would not be received 
automatically and was vital for proper risk assessments. 
Micro-prudential supervision, on the other hand, focuses on monitoring individual financial 
institutions. This task would in the proposed framework be performed by three European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) that would directly replace the old financial services committees. 
The ESAs would be part of a network with national financial supervisors, with a leading role for 
the European component in the network in the settlement of disputes between national authorities 
(Commission, 2009e: 8-14). In collaboration with delegates of the ESRC and the Commission, 
representatives of the three ESAs and the national supervisors would form an overarching steering 
committee: the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS). ESFS would have just one key 
objective, which was to restore and maintain a stable and reliable financial system, as this was seen 
as “an absolute prerequisite to preserving trust and coherence” (Commission, 2009e: 14). The 
combination of both micro- and macro-prudential supervision could offer significant synergies for 
overall supervision (Commission, 2009e: 14-15). This proposal went along with a direct request to 
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the Council to approve the new framework and an invitation to interested parties to submit reactions 
before mid-July 2009 (Commission, 2009e: 3).  
 The proposal was based on an impact assessment, which stated as the ‘ultimate objective’ 
of micro-prudential supervision that consumers and users had to be protected, by preventing 
negative externalities in terms of confidence in the financial system (Commission, 2009f: 9). 
Besides, in line with the recommendations of FIN-USE and UNI-Europa Finance safeguarding the 
interests of “consumers, investors, other users of financial services and other relevant stakeholders, 
notably employees” was a key pillars in the new system (Commission, 2009f: 15). Regarding the 
goal of strengthening confidence, the assessment underlined the complexity of measuring 
phenomena like trust of consumers and businesses, but it argued that indicators for this trend should 
be developed in more detail in official legislative proposals, which were planned to follow in the 
autumn of 2009 (Commission, 2009f: 39-40). 
 Overall, the Commission was rather preoccupied with the objective of establishing trust in 
the financial sector. In its assessment of a new framework, the importance was expressed explicitly, 
while its precise role in modern economic context was carried out implicitly throughout the 
proposal. Without further notice of why trust had to be re-established so badly, the Commission 
plainly introduced it as the overarching, primary mission of the entire reform, assuming that its 
importance for the financial system, the economy and the entire society is well-known by all other 
policymakers. Still, as a more explicit sign of the Commission’s comprehension of modern-day 
perspectives on economic exchange, it underlined extensively the lack of transparency and the 
imperfection of information in the financial sector, especially regarding its limitedness and the high 
(transaction) costs associated with it. 
The progress of the proposal’s passage 
During their meeting half-June, the Council approved virtually the complete communication of the 
Commission and encouraged the institution to provide legislative proposals by early autumn 2009 
to enable the possibility of a swift adoption of the new regulatory and supervisory framework at 
the Council’s meeting in October 2009 (European Council, 2009b: 6-8). A new public consultation 
of the Commission generated 98 responses, from a variety of organizations – ranging from Member 
States, public bodies and European or national (associations of) undertakings to consumer and user 
associations and trade unions – and EU citizens. Overall, most respondents supported the 
communication’s conclusions broadly, although several requested more detailed reports 
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(Commission, 2009g: 1 of Annex 4). The Member States and public bodies largely accepted the 
proposal, with some remarks on the delegation of decision making power. European and national 
(associations of) undertakings mainly pointed at the confidentiality of data of monitored firms and 
the argument that additional costs of the new framework should not be borne by the industry 
(Commission, 2009g: 1-3 of Annex 4).  
Consumer bodies expressed concerns regarding the limited influence of stakeholders – 
especially users and investors – and, therefore, recommended more profound policies regarding 
consumer protection. Trade unions also aimed more at the social aspects of the new regulatory 
framework. However, their focus was mainly on the protection and consultation of employees of 
financial institutions, and the possibility to adopt formal whistle-blower procedures (Commission, 
2009g: 3-4 of Annex 4). All in all, as was the case with the contributions at the High Level 
Conference, the focus on the importance of guarding the interests of and support from citizens – 
both clients and employees of financial institutions – to rebuild trust in the financial system mostly 
came from contributions of trade and consumer associations in the policy process. 
Having received both the Council’s consent and the advices of public stakeholder, the 
Commission proceeded its policy process by drafting legislative proposals for the establishment of 
a new financial supervision framework. An Impact Assessment Steering Group was established, 
consisting of members of ten Directorate-Generals of the Commission. This Steering Group met 
twice and in second instance their impact assessment was approved by the Impact Assessment 
Board. In their report, the Steering Group highlighted the undermined confidence of consumers, 
employees, pensioners, SME and retail investors as one of the main problems of the crisis 
(Commission, 2009g: 7). Furthermore, as in the previous Commission proposal, the role of 
information exchange in the new framework was dealt with extensively. The lack of information, 
and the fact that the limited information was barely accessible for supervisors and consumers before 
the crisis, was mentioned as a core problem in the run-up to the crisis (Commission, 2009g: 5, 7-
8). The Impact Assessment pointed out that the establishment of macro-prudential oversight could 
increase information exchange, transparency, confidence of pensioners, consumers and users of 
financial services (Commission, 2009g: 15-16, 19 and 7-8 of Annex 2). Compared to the Impact 
Assessment that accompanied the previous Commission communication, the goal of strengthening 
confidence and building instruments to monitor the progress of this goal had lost its prominent 
position in the proposal and was no longer part of the main objectives in the Impact Assessment.  
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The results of the Impact Assessment were published as an attachment to a set of draft legislations, 
adopted by the Commission on the 23rd of September in 2009. These legislative proposals arranged 
the creation of the ESRB and the ESFS, and they were commended to the Council and Parliament 
for rapid adoption. Similar to the publication of the Impact Assessment, the Commission did not 
mention the re-establishment of trust and its importance for the financial system in its press release. 
Rather, it mentioned as the aim of the reform the reinforcement of financial stability, through the 
establishment of equal basic technical rules and enforcement throughout the EU, the identification 
of risks and the more effective approach in emergency situations and to dispute among supervisors 
(Commission, 2009h). In addition to this package of legislation, necessary changes to existing 
financial sector directives were adopted by the Commission a month later in a package of ‘omnibus’ 
directives (Commission, 2009i). 
Yet again, the involved institutions showed commitment to the need to rebuild confidence 
in the financial system. Nonetheless, this objective was once again mainly build on the 
unpronounced comprehension of the vital role trust played in economic transactions according to 
contemporary economists. Although the policymaking institutions did not dwell on the exact 
functioning of trust in economic context, they did elaborate comprehensively on the new 
understanding of information in economics: the presence and role of imperfect information in the 
run-up to the crisis was worked out carefully, as well as proposals for mandatory information 
exchange between supervisors and market participants. 
Without any significant obstruction, the new proposal received broad support in October 
from ECOFIN and the Council. Both agreed that the Council had to start negotiations with the 
European Parliament on the legislation with a view to reaching agreement at first reading (Council, 
2009a: 7-8; European Council, 2009c: 9). Initial approval from both ECOFIN and the Council 
followed in December 2009 (Council, 2009b: 6-7, 13; European Council, 2009d: 5). Along with 
its approval, the Council spoke out its ambition for swift policy negotiations with the Parliament 
in 2010 and the introduction of the new framework in 2010 or at latest in 2011, so the reform could 
start with its objective of re-establishing “confidence of consumers and investors in financial 
markets” (European Council, 2009c: 5). 
Delay 
However, by mid-2010 there was still no political agreement between the Council and Parliament. 
In a communication to the Parliament, the Council, the EESC and the ECB, the Commission 
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claimed to work actively to find a compromise between the two policymaking institutions, and 
urged the two to make a deal before the summer break so that the new authorities could be installed 
in 2011 (Commission, 2010). The Commission argued that it had to press for rapid adoption “so 
that Europeans can regain full confidence in the soundness of the financial system as one of the 
pillars for growth” (Commission, 2010: 2). 
The reason for the delay can be found in the profoundness of the package and its passage 
process. Overall, the establishment of the ESRB and ESFS required six legislative proposals. The 
role of the ECB in the ESRB had to be formally confirmed through a Council regulation, the 
establishment of the EBA, ESMA, EIOPA and ESRB each had to be laid down in a distinct 
regulation, and the powers of the three committees monitoring financial institutions – CEBS, 
CEIOPA and CESR – had to be transferred to the three new ESAs through the amendment of 
eleven ‘omnibus’ directives.33 Although all legislative adjustments had an accelerated policy 
process, there were still multiple steps to be taken (see Table 1a to 1d).34 Table 1a combines the 
policy processes of the legislative proposals to establish the ESAs, as these were dealt with equally. 
After the publication of the Commission’s proposals, the six legislative proposals were referred to 
the Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, where the Committee appointed 
one of its members per proposal to review the piece as a rapporteur. Tables 1a to 1d show that for 
five of the six proposals, additional Committees were requested to provide an opinion on the 
proposals. 
  
                                                 
33 The six legislative proposals are summed up in the minutes of a debate in the European Parliament on the 6th of July 2010, 
which can be found on: European Parliament (2010a), ‘Minutes - PV 06/07/2010 – 11’, on:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=PV&reference=20100706&secondRef=ITEM-
011&language=EN&ring=A7-2010-0163 (visited on 9-1-2017). 
34 Data on the events during the procedures is retrieved from Parliamentary procedure files 2009/0140(COD), 
2009/0141(CNS), 2009/0142(COD), 2009/0143(COD), 2009/0144(COD) and 2009/0161(COD). 
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Table 1a-1d: Chronologic overview of policy process of the legislations establishing the ESFS and ESRB. 
Table 1a 
 
 
Date 
Regulations establishing the three ESAs  
EBA(A7-0166/2010) 
ESMA (A7-0169/2010) 
EIOPA (A7-0170/2010) 
 
 
Rapporteur 
appointed 
23/09/2009 Legislative proposal published   
07/10/2009 Committee referral announced in 
Parliament, 1st reading/single reading 
Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs 20/10/2009 
Committees for opinion: Budgets 21/10/2009 
Employment and Social Affairs No opinion 
Legal Affairs 05/10/2012 
Constitutional Affairs 24/11/2012 
02/12/2009 Debate in Council   
08/01/2010 ECB publishes review of regulations   
10/05/2010 Vote in committee, 1st reading/single reading  
03/06/2010 Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading  
06/07/2010 Debate in Parliament   
07/07/2010 Results of vote in Parliament   
07/07/2010 Decision by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading  
13/07/2010 Debate in Council   
22/09/2010 Accepted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading  
17/11/2010 Act adopted by Council after Parliament's 1st reading  
24/11/2010 Final act signed   
24/11/2010 End of procedure in Parliament   
15/12/2010 Final act published in Official Journal   
    
Table 1b 
 
Date 
 
Omnibus directive transferring powers from CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR to EBA, EIOPA and ESMA  
(A7-0163/2010) 
 
Rapporteur 
appointed 
26/10/2009 Legislative proposal published   
12/11/2009 Committee referral announced in 
Parliament, 1st reading/single reading 
Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs, 20/10/2009 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs No opinion 
Legal Affairs 14/12/2012 
17/03/2010 EESC publishes review of omnibus directive  
18/03/2010 ECB publishes review of omnibus directive  
10/05/2010 Vote in committee, 1st reading/single reading  
18/05/2010 Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading  
06/07/2010 Debate in Parliament  
07/07/2010 Results of vote in Parliament  
07/07/2010 Decision by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading  
13/07/2010 Debate in Council   
22/09/2010 Accepted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading  
17/11/2010 Act adopted by Council after Parliament's 1st reading  
24/11/2010 Final act signed  
24/11/2010 End of procedure in Parliament  
15/12/2010 Final act published in Official Journal   
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Table 1c 
 
Date 
 
 
Regulation establishing the ESRB (A7-0168/2010) 
 
Rapporteur 
appointed 
23/09/2009 Legislative proposal published   
07/10/2009 Committee referral announced in 
Parliament, 1st reading/single reading 
Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs 20/10/2009 
Committees for opinion: Budgets No opinion 
Employment and Social Affairs No opinion 
Legal Affairs 05/10/2012 
Constitutional Affairs 24/11/2012 
20/10/2009 Debate in Council   
26/10/2009 ECB publishes review of omnibus directive  
11/11/2009 Final act published in Official Journal   
20/01/2010 EESC publishes review of omnibus directive  
10/05/2010 Vote in committee, 1st reading/single reading  
25/05/2010 Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading  
06/07/2010 Debate in Parliament  
07/07/2010 Results of vote in Parliament   
07/07/2010 Decision by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading  
13/07/2010 Debate in Council  
22/09/2010 Accepted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading  
17/11/2010 Act adopted by Council after Parliament's 1st reading  
24/11/2010 Final act signed  
24/11/2010 End of procedure in Parliament   
15/12/2010 Final act published in Official Journal   
    
Table 1d 
 
Date 
 
 
Council regulation providing ECB with task in ESRB (A7-0167/2010) 
 
Rapporteur 
appointed 
23/09/2009 
Initial legislative proposal published Committee responsible: Economic and 
Monetary Affairs 
20/10/2009 
20/10/2009 Debate in Council   
26/10/2009 ECB publishes review of Council regulation   
11/11/2009 Final act published in Official Journal  
02/12/2009 Additional information  
21/01/2010 Legislative proposal published  
08/02/2010 Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading/single reading  
10/05/2010 Vote in committee, 1st reading/single reading  
21/05/2010 Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading  
06/07/2010 Debate in Parliament  
07/07/2010 Results of vote in Parliament   
07/07/2010 Decision by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading  
13/07/2010 Debate in Council  
22/09/2010 Accepted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading  
17/11/2010 Act adopted by Council after consultation of Parliament  
17/11/2010 End of procedure in Parliament  
15/12/2010 Final act published in Official Journal  
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Between the moment that rapporteurs were appointed and 10 May 2010 – the day that the revised 
proposals were approved by the Committee – the rapporteurs, their Committees and possible 
‘opinion’-Committees discussed the original proposal and the reports written by the rapporteurs 
several times. Moreover, during the preparation of the reports in Parliament, the ECB published 
opinions on all proposals, while the EESC expressed its opinion on the omnibus package and the 
legislative proposals for the establishment of the ESRB and the ESAs.35 In its publications, the 
ECB mainly suggested textual revisions to the proposal for amplification and clarification of its 
own role in the functioning of and collaboration with the distinct ESAs, the ESFS and the ESRB.  
The EESC, on the other hand, taking on the role of representative of civil society when 
assessing the omnibus package, stressed the issue mentioned before by trade and consumer 
associations: the need for structures for consulting “the occupational interests concerned, the trade 
unions, [and] the consumers of financial services” to broaden transparency for society and increase 
societal participation (EESC, 2010b: 2). In its opinion of the proposals regarding the establishment 
of the four new institutions, the EESC elaborated on this point, arguing for wider representation on 
the boards of the three ESAs (EESC, 2010a: 2). Moreover, the EESC proposed that the ESRB 
should request advice of relevant private actors, like financial sector representatives and consumer 
associations. The Commission instead proposed stakeholder groups, consisting of financial 
institutions employers, employees, users and consumers, coming together twice a year, which the 
EESC observed as too minor incentives for societal participation (EESC, 2010a: 2, 6). All in all, 
the EESC showed comprehension of the importance to increase societal involvement by lowering 
the information asymmetry between the public, and involved specialized regulators and financial 
institutions. Overall, this could enhance society’s level of care and concern for the financial sector. 
Based on the published opinions of the ECB and EESC, and on the debates within and 
between the Parliament’s Committees, the Committees agreed upon several adjustments to the 
original piece. For the Council regulation that entrusted the ECB with its new role in the ESRB, 
the rapporteur’s adjustments mainly entailed technical issues concerning information, 
confidentiality and the composition of the board of the ESRB (European Parliament, 2010b). The 
reviewed regulations concerning the establishment of the ESAs also had new references regarding 
the provision and confidentiality of information of financial market participants. Furthermore, 
                                                 
35 ECB (2009) Opinion CON/2009/88, ECB (2010a) Opinion CON/2010/5, ECB (2010b) Opinion CON/2010/23, EESC 
(2010a) Opinion ECO/268 and EESC (2010b) Opinion ECO/271. 
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these reviews also added a paragraph explaining the overall goal and function of the overarching 
ESFS, which was “to preserve financial stability and thereby to ensure confidence in the financial 
system as a whole” (European Parliament, 2010c; 2010d; 2010e). The review of the omnibus 
package predominantly consisted of minor adjustments with the main objectives of providing a 
consistent harmonization of financial regulation and its consistent application (European 
Parliament, 2010f). Finally, the review of the regulation establishing the ESRB contained claims 
for more openness, in line with EESC’s advice. The Committees suggested additional emphasis on 
the ESRB’s task to seek advice of relevant private-sector stakeholders including trade unions, civil 
society organizations and consumer associations. “In a spirit of openness”, six confidential, 
independent, non-ESA persons, preferably representing SMEs, trade-unions or providers and 
consumers of financial services should be members of the General Board (European Parliament, 
2010g: recital 13). 
Subsequently, the reviewed reports of the six legislative proposals were all supported by a 
broad majority in the Committee on 10 May, and tabled for a joint plenary debate in the Parliament 
on 6 July 2010. The debate – attended by Commissioners Rehn (Economic and Monetary Affairs) 
and Barnier (Internal Market and Services) – showed near to unanimous support for the tabled 
legislative texts. The MEPs expressed considerable concern for the necessity to adopt the texts, as 
they understood the enormous frustration in European society.36 However, the Parliament 
disregarded the Council and felt left alone by them, because they did not receive any written 
common position from the Council in which it expressed a response to the Parliament’s work. 
Furthermore, the Parliament was anxious that the Council wanted to marginalize the proposals, 
with the goal of safeguarding national powers and eroding the independence and decision making 
power of the new authorities.37 As MEP Giegold stated: “We will not allow the Council to water 
down the proposals made by the de Larosière group and those submitted by the Commission itself 
into a nationally prejudiced, parochial approach, by not responding to the experiences from this 
crisis, but engaging instead in narrow-minded bickering over powers.”38 MEP García-Margallo y 
Marfil argued to vote massively in favor of the legislative amendments to show the Council the 
                                                 
36 Contribution by MEP Ferreira in a debate on Financial Sector Supervision in the European Parliament on July 6, 2010. A 
report of the debate is published on European Parliament (2010h), ‘Debates - CRE 06/07/2010 – 11’, on: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20100706&secondRef=ITEM-
011&language=EN&ring=A7-2010-0167 (visited on 9-1-2017). 
37 Idem as footnote 36, contributions by MEPs Giegold, Goulard and Balz. 
38 Idem as footnote 36, contribution by MEPs Giegold. 
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core ideas that the Parliament want to highlight in their proposals, of which the first is that “the 
crisis will only be overcome when confidence recovers and transparency is re-established within 
markets, institutions and products”.39 
Commissioner Rehn argued that he understood the discussions between the Council and 
Parliament, for example regarding the composition of the board of the ESRB: “Should the Chair 
of the ESRB be elected, or should he or she be automatically the ECB President? Should the ESRB 
general board and steering committee include outside independent experts and, if so, with or 
without voting rights? Should the President of the EFC participate in the work of the ESRB? I am 
confident that these diverging requests by the Council and Parliament can be merged into a 
mutually acceptable solution.” 40 Nonetheless, he urged the two parties to come to an agreement, 
as quick adoption was necessary to ensure that the institutions would be up and running by 1 
January 2011. Rehn’s speech was to no avail, as the sentiment in Parliament was to postpone the 
vote in an attempt to remind the Council of its responsibilities and of the Parliament’s ability to 
come up with a more demanding an supranational report at a later stage in the process.41 
Indeed, at the vote on the 7th of July it was decided – with a close to unanimous result – to 
postpone the votes. Just days later, the Council adopted political guidelines for continued 
negotiations with the Parliament, and published a press release stating that thanks to “a large degree 
of convergence between the two institutions”, the Parliament would able to vote at its next plenary 
session, which was due to take place in September 2010 (Council, 2010b: 8). Finally, on the 2nd of 
September the Parliament and Council reached an agreement about the supervision of the European 
financial sector, and they spoke out the ambition to adopt the legislative proposals at short notice 
(Council, 2010c: 9). In line with that goal, the Parliament adopted the texts at first reading in its 
plenary session on 22 September42, while the Council formally adopted the texts at its subsequent 
meeting on the 17th of November without further discussion (Council, 2010d: 18-19). The final 
acts were published on 15 December 2010.43 
                                                 
39 Idem as footnote 36, contribution by MEP García-Margallo y Marfil. 
40 Idem as footnote 36, contribution by MEP Rehn. 
41 Idem as footnote 36, contribution by MEP Pittella. 
42 European Parliament (2010i), ‘Parliament gives green light to new financial supervision architecture’, on: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20100921IPR83190/parliament-gives-green-light-to-new-financial-
supervision-architecture (visited on 9-1-2017). 
43 Official Journal of the European Union, L 331, 15 December 2010: Regulation (EU) 1092/2010/EC, Regulation (EU) 
1093/2010/EC, Regulation (EU) 1094/2010/EC, Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, Directive 2010/78/EC and Council 
Regulation 1096/2010/EC 
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Overall, the EU’s key policymaking institutions showed great commitment to the argument 
of the significance of trust in economic context during the policy process of the reform of financial 
sector supervision, an issue that has been advocated so often in modern types of economics. 
Predominantly, policymakers did so by mentioning the phenomenon explicitly, while not 
elaborating on its exact function in economic transactions. From the De Larosière report on, the 
Commission, the Council and the Parliament emphasized the importance of rebuilding trust in the 
financial system. However, their methods of establishing trust were predominantly build on means 
of efficiency, cost reduction, power division and technical rules. Stakeholders representing 
specialized European, national or private interests in the field of financial institutions were 
preoccupied with enhancing efficiency and safeguarding their own legitimacy and interests. 
Finally, societal interest groups like consumer associations, the EESC and trade unions played an 
important role in emphasizing the need for consumer and employee rights to enhance the 
transparency and reliability of the financial system. 
Another key aspect of the new regulatory framework, mentioned regularly throughout the 
Commission’s proposals was the necessity of establishing clear and well-functioning systems of 
information distribution among supervisors and citizens. This proposal directly deals with the 
shortcomings that arise from the assumption of perfect information in traditional economics, and 
shows a clear comprehension and acknowledgement of contemporary perspectives on the 
limitedness and costs of information. 
 
 
Source: ESMA (2016b), ‘European Supervisory Framework’, on:   
https://www.esma.europa.eu/about-esma/governance/european-supervisory-framework 
4.5 Analysis of the implemented framework 
The approval of both the Parliament and the Council paved the way for the establishment of the 
ESFS and the ESRB. The ESRB came into force at 16 December 2010, and the ESFS at the 1st of 
Graph 1: Graphical display of European System of Financial Supervision. 
59 
 
January 2011. The ESFS system consists of three ESAs – EBA, EIOPA and ESMA – that all focus 
on supervision of a distinct part of the financial sector, and replace the CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR. 
The ESRB offers macro-prudential oversight, while the ESAs are involved in micro-prudential 
supervision (Masciandaro et al., 2011: 204). Within the framework, national authorities remain 
responsible for day-to-day supervision of individual financial firms, while the three ESAs have 
legal personality, which gives them rulemaking power but also the duty of accountability and 
adherence to high transparency standards. Furthermore, they have the right to investigate 
infringements (Council, 2010a: 3; Van Cleynenbreugel, 2015: 51-53; Masciandaro et al., 2009: 6). 
All ESAs are structured in the same unique and complex multi-layered framework. The bottom 
layer is composed of a heterogeneous group of national supervisory institutions – all structured in 
their culturally defined regulatory frameworks – while higher authority is granted to overarching 
ESAs (Masciandaro et al., 2011: 204-205). This decentralized structure makes the ESAs platforms 
for coordination and cooperation in financial sector supervision. As Barroso claimed, “it is a 
partnership between national supervisors and new European Supervisory Authorities, themselves 
based on existing committees of Member State supervisors”.44  
 First, the London based European Banking Authority (EBA) takes over the role of highest 
supervisory authority in the European banking sector from the national supervision authorities. The 
objective of the EBA is to enhance the functioning of the internal banking market, particularly 
through promoting convergence of effective and consistent micro-prudential regulation and 
supervision at the highest standards, and, most important, promoting convergence of prudential 
regulation and supervision at the highest standards (Fahey, 2011: 584-586; Masciandaro et al., 
2011: 209). Second, supervisory authority in the field of pensions, insurances and other social-
financial matters is transferred from the state level to the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA), which is sited in Frankfurt. EIOPA concentrates on protecting the 
public interest, as it contributes to a stable and effective financial system in the short-, medium- 
and long-term. EIOPA focuses on the smoothening of markets, consumer protection, appropriate 
regulation and international co-ordination of oversight in the insurance and pension sector (Kováts, 
2015: 2910).   
 Third, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) became the sole 
                                                 
44 Barroso, J.M.D. (2009), ‘Introductory remarks at the Joint Press Conference on European Financial Supervision’, 
Speech/09/273, Brussels, 27 May. 
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independent EU institution in the CRA sector with full supervisory authority over the CRAs, and 
consequently no direct power for national authorities. In line with ESFS’ broader goal, ESMA –
situated in Paris – described its core objective as contributing “to safeguarding the stability of the 
European Union's financial system by enhancing the protection of investors and promoting stable 
and orderly financial markets”45 as a way of enhancing financial stability and order in the economy 
(García Alcubilla & Ruiz Del Pozo, 2012: 47-54; Workshop CRA, 2014). The CRAs pay fees to 
ESMA for the costs ESMA makes for their registration and supervision. ESMA’s supervisory 
rights range from access to all relevant data of CRAs to the possibility of on-site inspections and 
even imposing penalties (García Alcubilla & Ruiz del Pozo, 2012: 51-55).  
The three sectors that are supervised in the new ESFS were confronted with a lack of full 
internalization of negative externalities when the crisis started, due to cross border trade – in other 
words; there was a lack of centralized financial information. Bringing the national parties together 
in a coordinated and cooperative, can be seen as a stepping stone to more integration. However, as 
long as considerable influence remains at the disposal of decentralized, national actors, full 
integration remains improbable (Masciandaro et al., 2011: 204-205). Furthermore, financial 
institutions maintain their authority to a large extent, due to the fact that their expert knowledge is 
superior to that of European and national institutions. Their advantage in means and knowledge, 
and the cruciality of their work for the economy, makes it hard for EU and national policymakers 
to limit the financial institutions in their functioning all too severe. 
Lastly, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is located in Frankfurt as well, and can 
best be described as an overarching advisory body without legal personality, that consists of the 
chairpersons of the three ESAs, a European Commissioner, the president and vice-president of the 
European Central Bank and the governors of national central banks.46 Despite the 
recommendations of the EESC and consumer and trade unions, the ESRB has no seat for an 
independent representative guarding the interests of consumers and employees. The ESRB did, 
however, include an Advisory Scientific Committee, composed of fifteen experts in the field of 
rights for SMEs, trade-unions and consumers. Chiefly, ESRB is responsible for macro-prudential 
supervision of the EU’s financial system. Furthermore, it attempts to diminish systemic risks to 
financial stability and avoid periods of financial distress, by taking into account financial markets 
                                                 
45 ESMA (2016a), ‘Who we are’, on: https://www.esma.europa.eu/about-esma/who-we-are (visited on 28-1-2016). 
46 ESRB (2016a), ‘Organisation and Structure’ , on: https://www.esrb.europa.eu/about/orga/board/html/index.en.html 
(visited on 2-3-2016). 
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and macro-economic developments, with the purpose of contributing to “the smooth functioning 
of the internal market and thereby ensure a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to 
economic growth”.47 ESRB executes its task by giving non-binding advice on EU-wide financial 
stability to EU Member States and the Council (Council, 2010a: 2; Hennessy, 2014: 156; 
Schammo, 2012: 771-772).  
With the establishment of the ESFS and ESRB in 2011, supervision of financial institutions 
is now formally incorporated in EU financial sector regulation. Financial transactions are built on 
mutual confidence between financial institutions and their counterpart – either consumers, states 
or other financial institutions – and the new framework provided the EU with tools to influence 
this trust-relationship. Altogether, the network of institutions collaborating in ESFS offers a 
European supervisory framework that strives for protection and improvement of the stability of 
and trust in the European economy: “[ESFS] was established as a consequence of the crisis in order 
to preserve financial stability, restore confidence in the financial system and ensure adequate 
consumer protection in the field of financial services” (Capriglione & Sacco Ginevri, 2016). 
At the day the ESFS entered into force, Michel Barnier – Vice-President of the Commission 
and the Commissioner involved in the reform – published an introductory article on the new ESAs 
and the ESRB.48 In his piece, the words of confidence and trust – so often and prominently 
mentioned in the preparatory stage of the ESFS – are not mentioned. Rather, he employed 
traditional economic concepts, like efficiency, effectivity and coordination. Instead of reminding 
the public about how this reform changes the financial sector in terms of its reliability and 
trustworthiness, Barnier talks about the reduced ‘costs’ for the ‘taxpayer’ and ‘efficiency’.  
 On the contrary, the three separate legislative texts establishing the three ESAs express 
more clearly the essentiality of regaining trust in the financial sector.49 The structure of the three 
legislative texts is similar to a great extent. The introductory statements of all three texts refer to 
the report of De Larosière’s High Level Group in 2008. The texts state that the report’s main 
purpose was to provide “recommendations on how to strengthen European supervisory 
arrangements with a view to better protecting the citizen and rebuilding trust in the financial 
                                                 
47 ESRB (2016b), ‘Mission, Objectives and Tasks’, on: https://www.esrb.europa.eu/about/tasks/html/index.en.html (visited 
on 2-3-2016). 
48 Barnier, M. (2011), ‘The Date of the 1st January 2011 marks a turning point for the European Financial Sector’, on: 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/barnier/headlines/speeches/2011/01/20110101_en.html (visited on 30-
12-2016).  
49 Regulation (EU) 1093/2010/EC, p.1., Regulation (EU) 1094/2010/EC, p.1. and Regulation (EU) 1095/2010/EC, p.1. 
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system”, and that the establishment of the three ESAs was a direct result of the advice of that report. 
The omnibus regulation, the Council regulation on the role of the ECB in the ESRB and the 
legislative text for the introduction of the ESRB contain similar references to trust, but the Council 
regulation and the omnibus package are rather technical in the rest of their text, while the regulatory 
texts on the establishment of ESRB mainly focuses on the ESRB’s role in macro-prudential 
oversight and macro-economic risk management.50 Furthermore, the introductory statements of the 
three ESAs contain a paragraph explaining the incontestable necessity of confidence for the 
functioning of the financial system and the internal market and they all contain several references 
to the importance of access to and distribution of relevant information.51  
 Moreover, the legislative texts of the three ESAs comprise an identical Article 2, which is 
dedicated to the overarching system in which the ESAs collaborate: the ESFS. The first paragraph 
of this article outlines explicitly the main objective of the ESFS, which is to ensure that rules are 
accurately implemented to preserve financial stability and ensure confidence in the financial system 
as a whole.52 Article 1 in the three legislations sets out identical objectives for the three ESAs, 
namely protecting the public interest and the long-term stability, through ensuring integrity, 
transparency and efficiency of financial markets.53 Although the main objective is worked out in 
smaller steps that contain terms of public interest, stability, effectiveness, efficiency and risk, the 
overall purpose of maintaining stability and ensuring confidence in the financial system is at the 
core of the operations of the ESAs and their overarching ESFS. Given the difficulty of 
conceptualizing trust in legal terms, the decision to use more commensurable terms, like consumer 
protection and public interest, to operationalize trust is justified. Overall, the policymakers have 
concretely touched upon the significance of trust in economic context and the objective of regaining 
confidence in the legislative texts that established the new supervisors of financial institutions, 
while the ESRB only briefly mentions the ESFS’ core purpose. 
With the regulatory framework that the three key EU policymaking institutions – the 
Commission, the Council and the Parliament – introduced, they actually created four new 
authorities – the ESRB and the three ESAs – with power in policymaking processes. Given the 
emphasis that the creators of the new institutions put on the objective of establishing trust in the 
                                                 
50 Regulation (EU) 1092/2010/EC, p.1. 
51 Idem as footnote 49. 
52 Idem as footnote 49, but in Article 2.1, instead of on p.1. 
53 Idem as footnote 49, but in Article 1, instead of on p.1. 
63 
 
legislative texts, one would suggest that this would be reflected in the official public expressions 
of the four as well. An official public document published by all four institutions is the annual 
report. This document sheds light on the objectives of an organization and the degree to which 
these have been reached. Therefore, whether or not regaining confidence is adopted in their annual 
reports gives insight in how preoccupied the new institutions are with their objective. Judging from 
their first annual reports in 2011, the four institutions seem to follow the same direction as the ones 
set out in legislation: the three ESAs are all to a great extent aware of their main objective, as they 
all mentioned it prominently in their reports, while the ESRB, on the other hand, mainly emphasizes 
its function of macro-prudential oversight, and the prevention and mitigation of macro-economic 
risks, and does not mention the overarching key purpose of its foundation (EBA, 2012: 3-4, 22; 
EIOPA, 2012: 23, 25; ESMA, 2012: 11; ESRB, 2012: 8-9). The annual reports, thus, confirm the 
perspective that followed from the examination of the legislative frameworks of the four 
institutions. 
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5. Conclusion 
5.1 Answer to the research question 
The analysis above has examined to what extent policymakers in Europe applied the 
understandings of modern economics during the European policy response in the financial sector 
after the crisis. The leading understandings of modern economists question classic economic 
theories that started from assumptions of perfect rationality and information, and disregarded the 
concept of confidence in economic context, as it was observed as a sociological and psychological 
phenomenon that was not applicable in economic models. Rather, present-day economists advocate 
the conviction that rationality is limited and that information is asymmetrically distributed between 
demanders and suppliers. Coherently, uncertainty arises in exchanges and contracts, hampering 
their efficiency. They underline that mutual trust is the key link to enable transactions in uncertain 
circumstances, and, consequently, urge policymakers to intervene and ensure confidence in 
markets where efficiency has been eroded due to the uncertainty of its participants. 
 Financial markets are particularly dependent on trust in the establishment of transactions 
between suppliers and demanders. Especially after the crisis in 2008, faith in the financial sector 
and its institutions had dropped to an all-time low. Major attempts to reform the regulation on 
supervision of the financial sector were launched in the aftermath of the crisis, which were 
concluded with the foundation of the ESFS in 2011. By formulating an answer to the research 
question: “To what extent did the intensified role of trust in modern economic theories shape the 
European regulatory policy response in the financial sector between 2008 and 2011?” this thesis 
contributed to the knowledge gap that exists due to a lack of analytical attention for the degree to 
which regulation can enable the building and maintaining of trust in the financial sector. 
Conclusions from the analysis of the process of problem identification 
The first part of the three-fold analysis revealed that EU policymakers applied modern trust theories 
to a great extent in their problem recognition and definition when the crisis unfolded. The argument 
of confidence in economic context can be found explicitly and implicitly in the reports of their first 
comprehension of the causes and consequences of the crisis. Despite differing stances of the 
Socialists and Liberal Democrats on the exact causes of the crisis – either the traditional capitalist 
system itself or its supervision and regulation – all three EU policymaking institutions shared the 
general belief that trust had vanished and had to be restored in their definition of the problems. For 
instance, the Commission explicitly referred to the loss of trust as one of the key problems at hand, 
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and published a communication document within a few days, with a rough planning for a rapid 
response to the crisis, in which financial institutions were to be subjected to tougher, cross-border 
supervision to regain the most important prerequisite for a well-functioning financial system; 
societal confidence. 
Conclusions from the analysis of the policy process 
Throughout the policy process the ideological foundation of modern economics was at the core of 
policymakers’ ideas. The most important policy document of the policy process – the De Larosière 
report – stressed the institutional shortcomings of financial sector supervision and the conflicts of 
interests and behavioral deficiencies of financial institutions who exploited informational 
advantages in an opportunistic way. The De Larosière group argued that due to these failures, 
confidence had vanished and in doing so the group employed modern economic assumptions of 
imperfect information and rationality. Overall, De Larosière put the re-establishment of confidence 
at the heart of its approach, and as a part of that, he argued for the enlargement of measures for 
transparency and protection of consumers. The expert group’s solutions, however, predominantly 
revolved around classic economic terms of efficiency, cost reduction and effectivity.  
During the process that developed after the De Larosière report, a similar pattern is visible 
in the input of the key EU policymaking institutions, the Council, Commission and Parliament. 
From the outset and throughout the process, they explicitly and frequently address how important 
they deem confidence for the efficient functioning of financial markets, and that regaining trust 
should therefore be the core objective of the policy response to the crisis in the financial sector. 
Nonetheless, the trust argument was mainly brought forward by policymakers without elaborating 
on the phenomenon’s exact function in the economy. Most likely, the reason for the lack of 
elaboration can be found in the extent to which involved policymakers and shareholders 
acknowledge the argument of confidence in economic exchange as a self-explanatory phenomenon. 
Due to the accounts of multiple contemporary economic scholars, like Stiglitz, Swedberg, Tonkiss, 
Sapienza and Zingales, who supported this argument and found proof for it in statistical tests, a 
stream of theoretical arguments in recent decades has convincingly persuaded the public and 
politics to adopt the new understanding of trust in economics as an important element of the 
functioning of financial markets. 
Still, the proposed solutions did not concretely address the issue of establishing confidence, 
but were rather technical instead. Specialized European and national financial sector institutions 
66 
 
and representatives of (associations of) financial institution largely ignored the concept of trust and 
only guarded the interests of the niche they represented. Finally, the group of stakeholders that 
guarded the societal interest – the EESC, trade unions and consumer associations – did come up 
with concrete suggestions to enlarge the transparency of financial sector supervision and broaden 
possibilities for protection and participation of consumers. These stakeholders intended to establish 
a (co-)decisive position for independent representatives of societal groups, like consumers and 
employees, in the board of ESRB. Although they did not realize such an influential position for 
consumer and employee representatives, the establishment of a permanent advisory committee to 
the ESRB – consisting of fifteen consumer and employee representatives - was achieved. 
Another leading element identified in the policy process of the ESFS throughout the 
Commission’s proposals and the reviews and inputs of other stakeholders and policymaking 
institutions, is the urge for establishing clear and well-functioning systems for the distribution of 
information to supervisors and citizens. This proposal directly deals with the shortcomings that 
arise from the assumption of perfect information in traditional economics, and shows the  
comprehension and acknowledgement of modern economic perspectives by policymakers, 
regarding the limitedness and costs of information. 
Conclusions from the analysis of the legislative texts 
The analysis of the adopted final legislative texts revealed a similar focus. Yet again, the overall 
purpose of maintaining stability and ensuring confidence in the financial system was put 
prominently at the core of the operations of all three ESAs and their overarching ESFS in the 
legislative texts. This mission was then worked out in smaller steps, which contained terms of 
public interest, stability, effectiveness, efficiency and risk. The difficulty of conceptualizing and 
measuring trust in objective and legal terms justified the decision to use more measurable and 
comparable terms to operationalize trust. Furthermore, the new regulatory framework indeed 
recognized the new insights of modern economists regarding limited information and information 
asymmetries, and adopted precise rules for the distribution and exchange of information between 
supervisors and market participants, to lower information disadvantages. 
Conclusions on the research question 
All in all, the modern economic approach in which confidence is said to be one of the key elements 
of a well-functioning, is acknowledged to a great extent by EU policymakers. Explicitly and 
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frequently, they stress the importance of trust for the efficient functioning of financial markets, and 
that the fact that regaining trust should therefore be the core objective of the policy response to the 
crisis in the financial sector. Still, the precise role of trust in financial markets has not regularly 
been worked out in the contributions of policymakers. As discussed above, the lack of explanation 
is most likely the result of the degree to which policymakers saw the new understanding of trust in 
economics as a self-evident argument, due to the considerable rise of attention in economics for 
the role of trust. Building on this argument, a distrusted financial system characterized by 
information asymmetries, moral hazard, high risk transactions and uncertainty could lead to a 
paralyzed financial system and, subsequently, a paralyzed global economy. When the public 
adopted this nightmarish scenario, a self-fulfilling process commenced and caused ongoing and 
aggravating economic distress in the EU. This urged EU policymakers to revise the entire financial 
sector regulation and supervision, and re-establish its trustworthiness.  
In the policy process that followed, policymakers did not primarily start from the traditional 
assumptions that emphasized that information and rationality are freely and completely obtainable, 
and that supply and demand would automatically meet at the most profitable outcome from a 
societal perspective. Rather, they analyzed the unfolded situation from modern behavioral 
economic arguments of costly, complex and incomplete information, uncertainty and moral hazard. 
Moreover, the excesses of the preceding liberal framework – build on traditional economic ideas 
of a free market where the invisible hand would establish an optimal market – that put too much 
responsibility and freedom at the side of financial institutions, led policymakers to execute a 
thorough reassessment of the institutions’ regulation and supervision. As a result, the policymakers 
observed that financial institutions had information advantages over their clients and misused this 
advantage at the expense of the entire society.  
To fix the reliability of failed financial markets, policymakers saw – in line with scholars 
like Bossone, Swedberg and Tonkiss – the necessity for public intervention, which due to the 
influences of globalization and financialization, did not had to take place at the national, but at the 
European level. The new framework needed to ensure information distribution of involved 
institutions, as well as more direct intervention possibilities for regulators and supervisors. Also, it 
had to be reliable in the eye of all market participants, with a specific focus on re-ensuring 
consumers, SMEs and investors of the trustworthiness of the financial sector. Therefore, 
stakeholders from all relevant perspectives were involved in the policy process, to come to an 
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outcome that would guarantee efficiency, effectivity and cost reduction, while maintaining the 
utmost level of societal confidence. 
The extent to which the diverse group of stakeholders adopted the new understanding of 
confidence in economic situations varied widely. As discussed, EU policymakers paid a 
considerable amount of attention to the subject. Stakeholders that guarded the societal interest, like 
the EESC, trade unions and consumer associations were even more engaged with the idea, and 
actively promoted possibilities to enlarge participation and transparency in the financial sector. 
Their attempts cannot be ignored in this process, as they were partially responsible for the 
establishment of a permanent, autonomous advisory committee as part of the ESRB, consisting of 
fifteen experts in the field of rights of SMEs, trade-unions and consumers.  
On the contrary, representatives of (associations of) private financial institutions largely 
ignored the argument of trust, and primarily focused on limited regulation and free competition to 
optimize the efficiency and effectivity of their services and products. This lack of consideration of 
the phenomenon underlines the shortcomings of private financial firms in the acknowledgement of 
the social function that their sector has developed over the last decades. Rather than being 
preoccupied with recovering the chaos they caused with their opportunistic and self-centered 
conduct in the run-up to the crisis, they merely focused on retaining a market that remained efficient 
and freed of all too profound rules. This attitude provides evidence for the lack of intrinsic social 
responsibility of financial institutions, and thereby accentuates the need for an exogenous 
institution that forces them to adjust the riskiness of their conduct to a level that corresponds to the 
societal risk and impact of their failure. 
Concretely, this realization resulted in a legislative framework that posed re-establishing 
confidence in the financial sector as its key purpose. Nonetheless, this overarching ambition is not 
explicitly adopted in any of the concrete policy measures or observable indicators. Rather, 
policymakers built on insights from contemporary economists and mainly focused on policy 
measures that enhance the transparency of financial institutions and their regulators, for example 
by compelling market participants to exchange information and give ESAs the power to execute 
inspections at financial institutions. Such measures lower information asymmetries and uncertainty 
for market participants and consumers, and tackle the problem of incomplete trust. Altogether, the 
adopted framework set out its main target of guaranteeing confidence in the financial sector 
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explicitly, and divides it in sub-targets, composed of technical rules to enhance the supervision in 
terms of efficiency, effectivity, coordination, transparency and distribution of power. 
5.2 Recommendations, limitations and suggestions for future research 
Recommendations 
This thesis had a clear focus on the emphasis policymakers put on the concept of trust. It revealed 
that politicians, stakeholders and policymakers were rather preoccupied with the concept, and put 
it at the center of their legislative proposals. Given the fact that modern economists have just 
recently zoomed in on the concepts of trust and confidence and that tests already showed a number 
of outcomes with significant impact on the traditional economic theories, a first recommendation 
would be to intensify the work of behavioral economics in the field of political economics and 
public policy. This could broaden the knowledge of policymakers and scholars on the impact, 
causes and consequences that confidence has in their field of study, and enables politicians and 
policymakers to design policies that correspond to the wishes of society, and particularly citizens, 
as optimal as possible. 
 Following that reasoning, policymakers should bear in mind the importance of the concept 
of confidence in each policy issue in which economic transactions and the functioning of markets 
are at stake. For instance, a possibility to ensure that the concept is borne in mind by EU 
policymakers in every relevant regulatory proposal might be to adopt the consideration of a 
regulation’s effect on societal trust in the Better Regulation Guidelines that the EU applies in the 
preparation of its legislative proposals (Commission, 2015). 
Limitations 
All in all, this thesis has shed light on the presence of arguments of trust in economic policy in the 
EU. In the Lamfalussy process confidence in economic context did not have a critical role in the 
creation of a new framework for financial sector regulation, while after the crisis the phenomenon 
was prominently present in the policy process following the publication of the De Larosière report. 
As a result, it can be concluded that trust arguments are considered in one of the largest economic 
policy process in recent EU history, and are thus acknowledged by EU policymakers as an 
important pillar in economic and financial regulation. Nonetheless, the fact that these arguments 
are present in economic policy nowadays does not provide any insight in the issue of what exactly 
caused its adoption in present-day policy considerations. Such an answer could only be retrieved 
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with alternative research approaches that have a more longitudinal character, applying data and 
publications of multiple cases of economic policy processes in the EU over the last decades. 
An important limitation to the type of research conducted in this thesis, is that it is largely 
based on official reports archived in formal European databases. Missing in these databases are 
reports of informal meetings, backroom politics and other interactions between policymakers and 
influential lobbyists and stakeholders. Although this inquiry does entail opinion statements of 
multiple stakeholders, these published documents might be watered down versions of their initial 
or informal perspectives. However, as informal meetings are unrecorded – or at least not publicly 
accessible – it is utopian to expect access to reports of what is discussed during these meetings. 
 Supplementary, deficiencies arise from the issue of how profound official publications can 
be analyzed. Statements of EU policymaking institutions in which they claim to have the objective 
of establishing trust on the top of their wish list, could be popular expressions with merely symbolic 
value, and the actual goal of ingratiating themselves with the electorate. On the other hand, the 
prominence and frequency with which the arguments are mentioned in consecutive public 
expressions of a broad group of policymakers and stakeholders in the aftermath of the crisis can 
also suggest that they genuinely strive for the establishment of confidence. A reason for the 
superficial manner in which the objective is regularly expressed by policymakers, can arguably be 
found in the extent to which policymakers deem the role of trust in economic context as self-evident 
– and, thus, unnecessary to dwell on all too extensively. The stance of contemporary scholars, like 
Tonkiss, Stiglitz and Swedberg and the De Larosière report (Commission, 2009a: 6) who all argue 
that “financial markets depend on trust”, is convincing and backed by scientific proof of multiple 
recent studies. Such an argument might be acknowledged as an incontestable truth by policymakers 
during the policy process. 
Lastly, a shortcoming in the research structure might be found in the lack of a test on how 
effective the established policy framework actually was in reaching its overall goal of regaining 
societal confidence in the financial sector. This could have been an interesting addition and 
conclusion to the thesis, but due to lacking statistical data this test is not (yet) executable. However, 
this remains a possibility for future research. 
Suggestions for future research 
As mentioned by scholars cited in this thesis, trust is a relatively new phenomenon in economic 
context, especially in the financial system, and it has not yet received much analytical attention. So 
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far, findings in recent years have identified that confidence is potentially of great importance in the 
economy and its markets. Expanding the knowledge on this phenomenon should therefore be one 
of the key aims of future research. Furthermore, many scholars have written reports on regulation 
of financial markets in general, and on the post-crisis regulatory framework of financial sector 
supervision in particular, while other scholars focused on the role of public institutions in 
establishing and maintaining trust. Up until now, however, there has not yet developed an elaborate 
range of works on the intersection of two subjects. Nonetheless, trust and a well-functioning 
financial sector are of key importance for society and the economy. The ability to establish 
confidence through regulation is therefore an indispensable instrument for policymakers and 
politicians in stabilizing their countries, and would, thus, also be an interesting direction for future 
research. 
 Finally, due to the fact that the crisis and the subsequent reform of the financial sector took 
place relatively recent, and due to a lack of (access to) complete statistical data on the development 
of citizen trust in the financial sector and its institutions, it was not (yet) possible to execute 
statistical tests to measure whether the reform indeed had a positive effect on the confidence EU 
citizens have in financial institutions since 2011. If data on this development becomes available 
over a longer period of time, it would be important to examine whether the applied policy response 
indeed managed to re-establish and maintain confidence in the financial sector. If so, the 
implemented framework and its coherent policy process could serve as an example for future cases 
of regulation in complex and knowledge-intensive markets, where expert knowledge and dynamic 
innovation exceed public capacity and outdate existing state regulation. An example of an evolving 
sector for which this can be relevant at short notice might, for instance, be the market of fintech-
firms (Trealeven, 2015). 
  
72 
 
6. Appendix I: Overview of the publications used in the analysis 
By Title Type of publication Date 
Council Regulation of European Securities Markets: Terms 
of reference for the Committee of Wise Men 
Press release 17-07-2000 
Lamfalussy Committee Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the 
Regulation of European Securities Markets 
Commission Report 15-02-2001 
Commission Review of the Lamfalussy process: Strengthening 
supervisory convergence 
Commission Report 20-11-2007 
Barroso, J.M.D. (President of 
the Commission) 
Remarks of President Barroso on financial crisis Speech 01-10-2008 
Representatives of Commission, 
Council and Parliament 
Report of debate CRE 08/10/2008 – 14 Parliamentary debate 08-10-2008 
Eurogroup Declaration on a Concerted European Action Plan 
of the Euro Area Countries 
Press release 12-10-2008 
Barroso, J.M.D. (President of 
the Commission) 
Creating a European Response to a Global Crisis Speech 14-10-2008 
European Council Presidency Conclusions 14368/08 Press release 16-10-2008 
Commission From financial crisis to recovery: A European 
framework for action 
Communication 29-10-2008 
Commission A European Economic Recovery Plan Communication 26-11-2008 
De Larosière Committee Report by the High-Level Group on Financial 
Supervision in the EU 
Commission Report 25-02-2009 
Commission Driving European recovery Communication 04-03-2009 
European Parliament Report of debate CRE 11/03/2009 – 3 Parliamentary debate 11-03-2009 
European Council Presidency Conclusions 7880/1/09 Press release 20-03-2009 
European Parliament Report of debate CRE 22/04/2009 – 4 Parliamentary debate 22-04-2009 
European Parliament Report of debate CRE 23/04/2009 – 13 Parliamentary debate 23-04-2009 
European Parliament Resolution of 24 April 2009 on the London G20 
Summit of 2 April 2009. 
Legislative text 24-04-2009 
Berès, P., P. Brady, M. Buti, G. 
Carosio, M. Grande, J. Holmquist, 
M.D. Knight, M. Koller, J. Król, 
C. McCreevy, A. Obolensky, O. 
Roethig, K. Schackmann-Fallis, J. 
Taylor, E. Wymeersch & F. 
Zunzunegui 
High-Level Conference ‘Towards a new 
supervisory architecture in Europe’ 
Speeches 07-05-2009 
Angeloni, I., M. Gudmundsson, G. 
Schinassi, A. Sutt & J. Viñals 
Brussels Economic Forum Speeches 15-05-2009 
Barroso, J.M.D. (President of 
the Commission) 
Introductory remarks at the Joint Press Conference 
on European Financial Supervision 
Speech 27-05-2009 
Commission European financial supervision + Accompanying 
Impact Assessment 
Communication 27-05-2009 
European Council Presidency Conclusions 11225/2/09 Press release 19-06-2009 
Commission Impact Assessment Report Commission Staff 
Working Document 
23-09-2009 
Commission ‘Commission adopts legislative proposals to 
strengthen financial supervision in Europe’ 
Press release 23-09-2009 
Council Press release of the Ecofin Council Press release 20-10-2009 
Commission ‘Financial services: Commission adopts additional 
legislative proposals to strengthen financial 
supervision in Europe’ 
Press release 26-10-2009 
ECB Opinion CON/2009/88 Opinion document 26-10-2009 
European Council Presidency Conclusions 15265/2/09 Press release 30-10-2009 
Council Press release of the Ecofin Council Press release 02-12-2009 
European Council Conclusions of the European Council EUCO 6/09 Press release 11-12-2009 
Commission Summary of public submissions on the De 
Larosière report 
Online publication 2009 
European Parliament Resolution on a European Economic Recovery 
Plan 
Legislative text 2009 
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ECB Opinion CON/2010/5 Opinion document 08-01-2010 
EESC Opinion ECO/268 Opinion document 22-01-2010 
ECB Opinion CON/2010/23 Opinion document 18-03-2010 
EESC Opinion ECO/271 Opinion document 18-03-2010 
Commission Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable 
Growth 
Communication 02-06-2010 
European Parliament Report of debate CRE 06/07/2010 – 11 Parliamentary debate 06-07-2010 
Council Press release of the Ecofin Council Press release 13-07-2010 
Council Press release of the Ecofin Council Press release 07-09-2010 
European Parliament ‘Parliament gives green light to new financial 
supervision architecture’ 
Press release 22-09-2010 
Council Press release of the Ecofin Council Press release 17-11-2010 
Council ‘Financial supervision: Council adopts legal texts 
establishing the European Systemic Risk Board 
and three new supervisory authorities’ 
Press release 17-11-2010 
Council Council regulation 1096/2010/EC Legislative text 12-2010 
Council & European Parliament Directive 201078/EC Legislative text 12-2010 
Council & European Parliament Regulation (EU) 1092/2010/EC Legislative text 12-2010 
Council & European Parliament Regulation (EU) 1093/2010/EC Legislative text 12-2010 
Council & European Parliament Regulation (EU) 1094/2010/EC Legislative text 12-2010 
Council & European Parliament Regulation (EU) 1095/2010/EC Legislative text 12-2010 
European Parliament Report on regulatory proposal A7-0167/2010 Legislative report 2010 
European Parliament Report on regulatory proposal A7-0166/2010 Legislative report 2010 
European Parliament Report on regulatory proposal A7-0169/2010 Legislative report 2010 
European Parliament Report on regulatory proposal A7-0170/2010 Legislative report 2010 
European Parliament Report on regulatory proposal A7-0163/2010 Legislative report 2010 
European Parliament Report on regulatory proposal A7-0168/2010 Legislative report 2010 
Barnier, M. (Commissioner for 
Internal Market and Services) 
‘The Date of the 1st January 2011 marks a turning 
point for the European Financial Sector’ 
Speech 01-01-2011 
EBA Annual Report 2011 Annual report 2012 
EIOPA Annual Report 2011 Annual report 2012 
ESMA Annual Report 2011 Annual report 2012 
ESRB Annual Report 2011 Annual report 2012 
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